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Abstract 
 
 
This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on 
policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have 
opposing interests in a public policy and offer  money and votes, respectively, to 
legislators to obtain their preferred policy. Comparing a unicameral and a bicameral 
legislative procedure, we show that bicameralism improves legislators' accountability 
when the same party controls the two chambers but not necessarily, if the two 
chambers are controlled by opposite parties. We also show that bicameralism with 
amendment rights (open rule) is better than bicameralism without amendment rights 
(closed rule). Finally, the evidence from a cross-country analysis, including 43 
democracies, is consistent with our theoretical findings. 
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1 Introduction
In modern democracies members of legislative bodies are appointed through popular
elections. Although, in principle, the legislature should only serve the interests of the
electorate, organized interest groups often try to influence legislators oﬀering money
or information in exchange for policy favors. According to a benevolent view, interest
groups convey information on individual preferences, thereby enhancing public de-
cision making. It often happens, however, that lobbies and citizens have conflicting
interests. In this cases, if it yields to lobby pressures, the legislature no longer serves
the interests of its constituents, implying that the accountability of the legislature
to the electorate is lost. Such considerations call us to question if voting is a good
instrument to provide incentives to legislators and how it is possible to increase the
electoral discipline.
According to several authors, institutional arrangements play a crucial role in
shaping politicians’ behavior and preventing legislators from abusing their power1.
Recognizing the link between institutions and incentives, our work focuses on the role
of legislative arrangements in the solution of the accountability problem.
The purpose of this paper is to assess whether a legislator is more accountable to
voters when the parliament consists of one chamber (unicameral system) as opposed
to two chambers (bicameral system). It has been argued2 that bicameralism reduces
the risk of abuse of power by a unique legislative body3. Hence, if we believe that
1For a general discussion on the role of institutions in preventing abuse of power see D.C. North
and B.R. Weingast (1989), ”Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Govern-
ing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, The Journal of Economic History.
2For a comprehensive descriptive analysis on governmental institutions in a comparative approach
see, for example, D. G. Hirchner and C. Levine, Comparative Goverment and Politics, Harper and
Row, Publishers, New York, 1981. For a more specific reading on bicameralism see G. Tsebelis and
J. Money, Bicameralism, Cambdrige University Press, 1997.
3Bicameralism is generally adopted in federal states including the United States, Germany,
Switzerland, where the interests of the states are represented in the second chamber. However,
bicameralism may also be found unitary states such as Spain or Italy. In this case, the justification
for a second chamber is not really the existence of a double base for representation but the risk of
abuse of power by a unique legislative body.
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bicameralism reduces the chance of abuse, we should conclude that bicameralism
helps to solve the accountability problem. However, a number of countries are char-
acterized by formal or de facto unicameralism4 and there is no clear evidence that
in those countries legislators are less accountable to voters. Scandinavian countries
are the most striking example of unicameral systems with very low corruption level.
In general, looking at cross-country evidence from a sample of democracies including
OECD countries, Latin America, Asia and Africa it is very diﬃcult to find a clear
correlation pattern between corruption and bicameralism.
This paper presents a formal investigation of the eﬀect of bicameralism on policy
choice, which shows that the magnitude of the eﬀect of bicameralism on accountability
crucially depends on other political features such as the polarization of the political
race and the bargaining power of the lobbies. In other words, bicameralism improves
accountability only in a subset of cases. Our analysis therefore helps to reconcile the
argument justifying bicameralism and the stylized facts.
Despite a rich literature studying separately electoral competition, lobbying and
democratic institutions, these issues have rarely been analyzed jointly. To our knowl-
edge, Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Helpman and Persson (1998) and Diermeier
and Myerson (1999) are the only formal works that analyze lobbying and legislation
jointly. Research dealing simultaneously with voting, lobbying and legislation is even
more scant5. Our model provides a contribution in this direction.
The outline of the model is as follows. Citizens delegate to policy-makers the
power to decide on a public project. Diﬀerent types of projects can be realized and
policy-makers choose their most preferred type of project. Citizens have preferences
over the diﬀerent types and therefore their private benefit from the public project
depends on identity of the policy maker. Each type of project may be undertaken
at either a high or low cost. The project is contracted to a private firm that obtains
4For example, Norway is a case of unicameral legislature. In other cases the power of the second
chamber is limited in such a way that the legislature works as a unicameral system, as in Britain
where the second chamber (House of Lords) has no power over money bills.
5Denzau and Minger (1986) study the relationship between voters, lobbies and legislators in a
reduced-form model that does not provide micro-fundation for the agents behaviour.
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positive profits if the high cost project is selected and zero profit if the low cost
project is selected. Hence, firm and citizens have opposite interests on the cost of the
project. They will try to influence the legislator in order to obtain their preferred
cost. The instruments they can use to influence the legislators are diﬀerent.
Citizens typically interact with the policy maker only when elections are called,
as the policy maker needs the support of voters to be reelected. Therefore, if the
incumbent legislator chooses a high cost project, citizens can punish the incumbent
by electing a challenger. The firm can engage in a lobbying activity oﬀering monetary
transfers to the legislator. When the legislator and the lobby can bargain to share
the surplus deriving from the policy, the project that maximizes their joint surplus
is chosen.
The project that maximizes the surplus can be either the low cost or the high
cost project. The high cost project generates a higher level of profits then the low
cost project. However it also produces an electoral loss because, when the incumbent
legislator chooses the high cost project, he will not be reelected and therefore he will
no longer have the power to choose his most preferred type of project. Clearly, the
bigger the distance between the preferences of the incumbent and the preferences of
the challenger, the higher will be the electoral loss.
Since we assume that the incumbent cannot indefinitely run for oﬃce, in his last
mandate he will not face elections and therefore he will choose the high cost project.
On the other hand, when the legislator can run for elections, in order to choose
the high cost project, he will claim a compensation for the electoral loss. Loosely
speaking, the electoral loss can be interpreted as the cost of lobbying since, for the
lobby group to obtain the high cost project, the electoral loss must be compensated.
Since the lobby in the second period can bargain with the newly elected challenger,
the surplus captured by the lobby in the second period can be used to compensate
the electoral loss of the legislator in the first period. Hence, if the future surplus
captured by the lobby is suﬃcient to compensate the current electoral loss, the high
cost project can be chosen and the legislator is not accountable to voters.
Given that an accountability problem arises when lobby can oﬀer transfers to
3
legislators, we ask whether the legislative procedures, aﬀecting the cost of lobbying,
can increase accountability. In particular, we compare a unicameral and a bicameral
system to see which legislative procedure is better for accountability purposes. In-
tuitively, the bicameral system, increasing the number of legislator, should increase
the electoral loss (cost of lobbying). We show that the eﬀect of bicameralism on
accountability depends on the decision power and on the policy preferences of the
two chambers. In particular, a bicameral system where the two chambers have same
proposal power and same preferences for policy types is better then a unicameral
system. If the two chambers have diﬀerent preferences for the type of policy, this
result needs not to be true. We also compare diﬀerent bicameral systems and we
show that bicameralism with amendment right of the second chamber (open rule) is
better than bicameralism with no amendment right of the second chamber (closed
rule). Finally, we also discuss an example where bicameralism generates the same
policy outcome than unicameralism. This happens if there is already a policy in
place (status quo policy) preferred by the lobby against an alternative policy that is
preferred by voters.
We conclude this paper with an empirical test of the model. We examine the ev-
idence from 43 democracies and we find that polarization and bicameralism directly
reduce corruption. We also find that the interaction between bicameralism and po-
larization and bicameralism and heterogeneity of legislators party membership play
an important role. In particular, bicameralism increases corruption when legislators
are likely to belong to diﬀerent parties and the political race is polarized, while the
opposite holds when the polarization is low. Therefore, we conclude that our model
is consistent with the data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the model and discuss
the assumptions. In section 3 we characterize of the equilibrium under unicameralism
and we discuss the results. Section 4 deals with bicameralism and accountability. In
section 5 we analyze the eﬀect of the polarization in the political race. In section 6 we
present the empirical evidence. In Section 7 we summarize the results and conclude.
4
2 Economic environment
The economy is composed of N individuals. Let k denote the generic individual in
the community N. We assume that there are three classes of individuals: citizens
denoted k = i, lobbies denoted k = l and legislators denoted k = j. The citizens i
delegate to the government j the authority to decide on a public policy. The policy
choice is as follows. First, the legislator has to decide whether or not to implement
a policy. If he decides to implement the policy, he has also to decide on the type of
policy he wants to implement and on its cost.
The type of the policy is a characteristic on which individuals have diﬀerent tastes.
Depending on the policy, the type can represents diﬀerent aspects. For example, in
the case of the production of a public infrastructure, the type could be the location;
if we consider a reform, the type could be the reforming strategy (timing, sequencing
etc.) and so on. We assume that policy makers are policy motivated on the type
dimension. Let aj denote the policy type delivered by the legislator j. Given the
policy maker j and the generic individual k of the community N , we define akj the
utility enjoyed by the individual k when the legislator j is choosing the policy and
we assume that ajj = max
k
akj..
The cost of the policy is paid by the all the citizens of the community. We
represent the per capita cost paid by citizens by C ∈
©
CL, CH
ª
, with CH > CL.
Therefore, the policy choice can be represented as a vector (P,C, aj), with C ∈©
CL, CH
ª
and P ∈ {0, 1} , where P = 0 means that no policy is selected and P = 1
means that a policy of type aj and cost C is implemented.
Besides the utilities akj , the policy generates a profit Π (P,C) increasing in both
arguments which is assumed to go to the lobby l. We can think of various kinds of
policies generating extra-benefits for a particular group of individuals. An interpre-
tation of our assumption can be that the policy consists in the provision of a public
good produced by private firms that receive an extra-benefit (profit) compared to
other citizens. Other examples of public policies creating special private benefits for
some groups are reforms, such as privatization and liberalization.
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Finally, we assume that the lobby group l can oﬀer money to the legislator in
exchange for a policy favor. Let Tlj denote a monetary transfer from the lobby l to
the legislator j. In formal terms, let Vkj (.) be the payoﬀ of the individual k when
the policy maker j is in power, then the payoﬀs of citizen i, lobby l and policy maker
j can be written as follows:
Vij (P, aj , C) = aijP −CP (1)
Vlj (P, aj , C, Tlj) = aljP +Π (P,C)− CP − Tlj (2)
Vjj (P, aj , C, Tlj) = ajjP + Tlj −CP (3)
To summarize, the policy maker j decides whether or not to implement a policy,
P ∈ {0, 1}. If the he decides to implement the policy, P = 1, then he also decides
on the cost of the policy, C ∈
©
CL, CH
ª
, and on the type of the policy, aj . The
generic individual k of the community N receives the utility akj from the policy and
pays the cost C ∈
©
CL, CH
ª
of the policy. When this generic individual is a lobby
group, k = l, he also receives an extra-benefit from the policy, Π (P,C) and may pay
a transfer Tlj to the policy maker j. Finally we assume that the profit from the high
cost policy is bigger than the sum of the percapita cost paid by the lobby and the
legislator6 and we denote π (1, C) the diﬀerence between the profit and the sum of
the those costs.
6This assumption captures the idea of conflict of interest on the cost dimension between voters on
one side, and lobby and legislator on the other. The lobby and legislator can share a profit which oﬀset
the cost of the policy, while the citizens cannot do so. When there is a single legislator this means that
π
¡
1, CH
¢
= Π
¡
1, CH
¢
−2CH ≥ 0. If there are two legislators then π
¡
1, CH
¢
= Π
¡
1, CH
¢
−3CH ≥ 0.
Alternatively, we can obtain the same results assuming that the citizens only pay the cost so as to
make the conflict of interests stronger and simply assume Π (1, C) ≥ 0.
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2.1 The game
The public policy is chosen by the policy maker j who interacts with the citizens i via
the election and with the lobby l through the lobbying process. The lobbying process
consists in a bargaining game between the lobby and the policy-maker to share the
surplus deriving from the policy.
The timing of the game between policy maker, lobby and citizens is as follows.
The game lasts for two periods7 t, where t ∈ {1, 2}. At the beginning of the game an
exogenously given legislator j is appointed to choose the policy (P,C, aj). In every
period t there is a new policy (P,C, aj) to be selected. The policy generates a given
payoﬀ for each player. Since monetary transfers between the lobby and legislator
are possible, then the lobby and the legislator can share their joint surplus from the
policy. We define St (P,C, aj) the joint surplus of lobby and legislator in period t
from the policy choice (P,C, aj). As a consequence of the bargaining, the policy
maximizing the joint surplus of lobby and legislator is chosen. In t = 2, citizens
observe the policy choice (P,C, aj) made by the incumbent8 j in the previous period
and an election takes place. The candidate receiving the majority of votes wins the
electoral competition. After the election there is again a lobbying stage; then a policy
(P,C, aj) is selected and the game ends. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events
in each period.
t=1     t=2 end
  voting
  
bargaining stage   bargaining stage
Figure 1 - timing
We model the sharing of surplus between lobby and legislator using a Nash bar-
gaining approach. The bargaining is as follows. There is a set of policies (P,C, aj)
that can be chosen. If in t = 1, the lobby and the legislator find an agreement on
a policy, they share the surplus from the policy. We define αj and αl the shares of
7 In the rest of the paper we will interchange the terms period and mandate.
8They do not observe the transfer from the lobby to the legislator.
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surplus received by the legislator j and by the lobby l if they reach an agreement. If
no agreement is reached, they receive a given disagreement payoﬀ. We denote
_
V tj
and
_
V tl their disagreement payoﬀs in period t.
The electoral competition has the following characteristics. The identity of the
candidates participating to the political race is determined by ideological political
parties labelled party A and party B. The two parties select two candidates from a
population distributed according to the preferences for policy types9. The two parties
locate symmetrically around the median voter, which means that each party can only
select a candidate on the left (right) of the median voter and each candidate then
receives an equal number of votes. This assumption restricts the candidates to the
subset j ∈ {A,B} with ideologies (types), aA and aB, symmetrically located around
the median voter10. Therefore finally only two types of candidates, aA and aB, run
for elections.
At the beginning of the first period one of the two parties puts in place a policy
maker j ∈ {A,B}. Let’s assume that the policy maker in the first period is j = A.
During the first mandate, the incumbent A choose the policy and one period later
an election will take place, where the incumbent A will face a challenger B. Hence,
in t = 2, the citizens observe the policy chosen by the incumbent A in the first
9Preferences on the ideological dimension are single picked, hence individuals can be ordered
according to their preferences for policy types. We assume also that the distribution is symmetric
with respect to the median voter. Later on in the paper we give some examples of symmetric
distributions and we discuss the implication of diﬀerent distributions.
10Technically we assume that: | amA − amm |=| amB − amm | .
Since two candidates compete for the election, to avoid the trivial case where one candidate has an
absolute advantage in the political race, both candidate must have a chance of winning the election.
Given that in our model the ideological dimension is fixed and determined by the party position, for
both candidates to have a chance of winning it must be that, when both candidates choose the same
cost C ∈
¡
CL, CH
¢
, there is no aA and aB such that one candidate wins the election. In other words,
if the candidates choose the same cost, then no party can win the election on ideological grounds.
Therefore, loosely speaking, since the ideology component is not suﬃcient to break the indiﬀerence
of the majority, the political issue that can make a diﬀerence in the electoral outcome is the cost
of the policy. This is equivalent to say the cost of the policy is the ”politically salient” issue as in
Besley-Coate (2000).
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period and decide whether to reappoint A or to replace him with the challenger B.
The voting strategy for the citizen i facing an incumbent A and a challenger B 6= A
consists in a mapping σiA : (P,C, aA) → {0, 1} , where 1 means reelection of the
policy maker A by the citizen i and 0 means that the citizen i replaces the incumbent
A with the challenger B. Voters do not observe the transfers between lobby and
legislator but they know that lobbying occurs. In equilibrium citizens, anticipating
that the lobby and the legislator share their surplus, choose the voting strategy that
gives them the highest utility11.
3 Sharing rules and policy choice
The lobby group and the legislator can share their joint surplus from the policy choice
using monetary transfers. If no transfers (no lobbying) were allowed, the legislator
would choose the policy maximizing his individual payoﬀ. But when the lobby and
legislator can bargain over the surplus, then the policy maximizing their joint surplus
will be chosen. Our objective is to understand how the sharing of surplus aﬀects the
policy choice. In particular, we would like to know if the policy selected by the
bargaining is diﬀerent from the policy that a legislator would choose in absence of
lobbying. Hence, let’s start analyzing the policy choice in absence of lobbying.
If there are no monetary transfers, the payoﬀ of the legislator depends only on
the type of project selected and on the taxes paid to finance the project. During
his first mandate a legislator choose his most preferred policy type and decides on
the cost of the policy. At the end of the mandate, his choice is observed by voters
that decide whether to reappoint the legislator for the second mandate or to replace
him with the challenger. Given the voting decision of the citizens, the legislator can
compute the expected payoﬀ from each policy choice and choose the policy that gives
him the highest payoﬀ. To compute the equilibrium policy, we need to introduce the
11Formally, The equilibrium of the voting game is a vector Σ∗j (P,C, aj) of individual voting decision
σ∗ij (P,C, aj) such that, given the sharing rules αj and αl:
Vij
¡
P,C, aj ,Σ∗j (.)
¢
≥ Vij
¡
P,C, ajt ,Σjt (.)
¢
∀Σj (P,C, aj) 6= Σ∗j (P,C, aj)
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voting decision associated to each policy. We make the conjecture that the legislator
is reelected if he choose the low cost project or if he doesn’t choose any project and
is not reelected if he chooses the high cost project12.
Let A be the incumbent legislator and B the challenger. Then given the policy
types and the equilibrium voting strategy, the policy choice with no lobbying is the
following13:
Proposition 1 If no transfers between lobby and legislator are allowed, then the
legislator chooses the policy
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
in both mandates.
Therefore, from proposition 1 we learn that, when no transfers are allowed, the
legislator chooses the most preferred voters’ policy. This is not surprising as in this
case the legislator is subject only to electoral incentives.
We analyze now the policy choice when the lobby and the legislator can share
their joint surplus. We know that the legislator can choose a low cost project or an
high cost project and we would like to see how the policy choice depends on sharing
rules.
Given the surplus, St (P, aj , C), the disagreement payoﬀs
_
V tj and
_
V tl, and the
shares of surplus αj and αl,the payoﬀ of each player participating to the sharing of
surplus can be written as follows:
12 In formal terms, using the definition of voting strategy:
Σj (P, aj , C) =
h
σij
³
1, aj , C
H
´
= 0,σij (0, 0, 0) = 1,σij
³
1, aj , C
L
´
= 1
i
we will prove in appendix that this is indeed an equilibrium voting strategy. The intution for
this result is the following. In the last period the incumbent is always choosing the policy
¡
1, CH
¢
because the game ends and he cannot be punished or rewarded by the voters. Hence, the best the
voters can do is to use a voting strategy that allows them to obtain their most preferred policy at
least in the first period. This strategy is the one that punishes the incumbent if he is chosing the
worse policy for voters,
¡
1, CH
¢
and rewards the incumbent if he doesn’t. Any other strategy will
give the voters lower utility.
13Proofs of all the propositions and lemmata are provided in appendix.
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V tj (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) =
_
V tj + αj
·
St (P, aj , C)−
_
V tj −
_
V tl
¸
V tl (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) =
_
V tl + αl
·
St (P, aj , C)−
_
V tj −
_
V tl
¸
Where clearly the sum of V tj (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) and V tl (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) gives the
joint surplus, St (P, aj , C).
Note that, for the bargaining to occur it must be that there is at least an agreement
preferred to the disagreement event by both players, i.e. there must be at least an
agreement for which the surplus from the agreement is bigger then the sum of the
disagreement payoﬀs. Once we have verified that there are agreements for which this
condition is satisfied, in order to determine the equilibrium policy we have just to
look for the policy that maximizes the surplus.
We will solve the game by backward induction. The solution depends on the dis-
agreement payoﬀ. Therefore, we need to specify what happens to the policy choice in
case of disagreement. In our model we can figure out diﬀerent disagreement scenarios.
For example, if the project can only be authorized by the legislator and can only be
executed by a firm, then in case of disagreement, no project can be chosen. Hence,
the disagreement outcome is the policy choice (0, 0, 0) and the disagreement payoﬀs
of the two players will be identical. On the other hand, if one of the two players can
realize the project independently of the other player, then the disagreement payoﬀs
of the two players could be asymmetric. For example, suppose that the government
is the only agent that can authorize the project and there are several firms that
can realize the project. In this case, if the bargaining between the legislator and one
firms breaks down, the legislator can always find a way to realize the low cost project.
Therefore, the disagreement payoﬀs for the firm will be the utility she obtains when
no policy is chosen, while the legislator will obtain the utility of the low cost project.
In general, we can think about several possible disagreement payoﬀs, and for each
disagreement payoﬀ we can solve the bargaining.
We can easily verify that, in the second period, given any pair of disagreement
11
payoﬀs14,
³ _
V 2j
_
;V 2l
´
the following holds:
Lemma 1. Given the policy choices
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
,
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
, (0, 0, 0) , the following
holds:
S2
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
−
_
V 2j −
_
V 2l > 0
S2
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
−
_
V 2j −
_
V 2l ≥ 0
S2 (0, 0, 0)−
_
V 2j −
_
V 2l < 0
From lemma 1 we see that, there are two policies,
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
and
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
,
for which the payoﬀ each player obtains from an agreement is not inferior to their
disagreement payoﬀ. It is trivial to verify that, for any possible sharing rule dividing
the surplus between the lobby and the legislator, the high cost project is the surplus
maximizing policy. Hence, formally we can state the following result:
Proposition 2 During the second mandate, given any share αl , the policy
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
is chosen.
We can now move to the first period to characterize the equilibrium policy out-
come. The main diﬀerence between the first and the second mandate is that in the
first mandate the legislator faces elections. We know that the electoral outcome will
have an eﬀect on the payoﬀ of lobby and legislator because the identity of the future
policy maker determines the selection of the future policy types aj . Furthermore,
if the legislator is not reelected, in the second period he will not participate to the
sharing of surplus with the lobby. Therefore, the legislator and the lobby, bargaining
14Given our economic environment, in the second period, depending on whether or not the two
players can realize the project independently, there are four possible pairs of disagreement payoﬀs:µ _
V 2j =
_
0;V 2l = 0
¶
,
µ _
V 2j = ajj
_
;V 2l = alj
¶
,
µ _
V 2j = ajj
_
;V 2l = 0
¶
,
µ _
V 2j = 0
_
;V 2l = alj
¶
In the first pair, none of the players can realize the project on his own. In the second pair both
players can realize the project independently. In the third and forth pairs only one player can realize
the project independently of the other player.
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over the surplus deriving from a the current policy choice, will take into account the
eﬀect of the policy choice on the electoral outcome.
Given the incumbent A, and the challenger B, the payoﬀs of the incumbent and
the lobby during the first period are as follows:
V 1A (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) =
_
V
1
A + αj
·
S1 (P, aj , C)−
_
V 1A −
_
V 1l
¸
V 1l (P, aj , C,αj ,αl) =
_
V 1l + αl
·
S1 (P, aj , C)−
_
V 1A −
_
V tl
¸
Again we have to verify that there is at least an agreement for which the players
obtain a payoﬀ which is bigger then their disagreement payoﬀ. Hence, for a generic
pair of disagreements payoﬀs15
³ _
V 1j ,
_
V 1l
´
we can verify the following:
Lemma 2 Given the policy choices
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
,
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
, (0, 0, 0) and given the
disagreement payoﬀs
³ _
V 1j ,
_
V 1l
´
, in the first period the following holds:
S1
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
−
_
V 1j −
_
V 1l Q 0
S1
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
−
_
V 1j −
_
V 1l = 0
S1 (0, 0, 0)−
_
V 1j −
_
V 1l < 0
From lemma 2 we can see that, in first mandate the high cost project is not
always a profitable bargaining outcome. Therefore, to see if the high cost project
can be chosen, for every possible pair of disagreement payoﬀ,
µ_
V
1
j ,
_
V
1
l
¶
, we have
to verify under which conditions the agreement on the high cost project is preferred
to the disagreement event and to the agreement on the low cost project. In formal
terms, we can prove the following result:
15The four possible pairs of disagreement payoﬀs in the first period are the following:µ
_
V
1
j = αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,
µ
_
V
1
j = aAA + αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = alA + αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,µ
_
V
1
j = aAA + αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,-
µ
_
V
1
j = αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = alA + αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
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Lemma 3 If αl ≥ (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA−
_
V
2
l
S2(1,aj ,CH)−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
, then the high cost project is chosen.
Otherwise the low cost project is chosen.
Therefore, from lemma 1 and lemma 2 we conclude that, in the second mandate
the high cost project is always chosen, while in the first mandate the high cost project
is chosen if and only if the share of surplus received by the lobby is suﬃciently high,
i.e. αl ≥ (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA−
_
V
2
l
S2(1,aj ,CH)−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
. Clearly, the diﬀerence between the first and the
second mandate is related to the electoral discipline. Indeed, if we write the surplus
associated to the high cost and low cost project we can see the eﬀect of the elections
on the surplus:
S1
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
= aAA + alA + aAA + alA + π
¡
1, CH
¢
S1
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
= aAA+alA+π
¡
1, CH
¢
+aAB−CH+
_
V 2l +αl
·
S2
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
¸
If the low cost project is selected, then in the first period the lobby and the legis-
lator just obtain the benefit from the policy type (aAA + alA), while on the second pe-
riod they obtain the benefit from the policy type and the profit16,
¡
aAA + alA + π
¡
1, CH
¢¢
.
If the high cost project is selected, then in the first period the lobby and the
legislator obtain the same surplus that they obtain in the second period when they
choose the low cost project,
¡
aAA + alA + π
¡
1, CH
¢¢
. On the other hand, given
the electoral outcome17, in the second mandate the incumbent legislator obtains the
benefit from the policy type chosen by the challenger minus the taxes paid to finance
the policy, aAB−CH . While, the lobby group, sharing the surplus with the challenger,
obtains the payoﬀ
_
V 2l +αl
h
S2
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
i
. Therefore, if we compare the
high cost and the low cost project, it is clear that the high cost project generates
higher profits. However, the higher profits are not suﬃcient to insure that the surplus
of the high cost project is bigger then the surplus of the low cost project because the
16Remember that π(1, C) is the profit net of taxes paid by lobby and legislator.
17The challenger replaces the incumbent.
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high cost project implies a change of policy type (electoral loss) that might reduce
the total surplus.
From lemma 3, it is also clear that, the outcome of the bargaining depends on the
disagreement payoﬀs. So far we have considered all the possible disagreement payoﬀs
that we think could arise in our set up. Now, we make a precise assumption on the
disagreement payoﬀ and we carry on our analysis under this assumption18:
Assumption 1 In the first and second mandate the disagreement payoﬀs are the
following:µ_
V
1
j = ajj + αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
1
l = αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
³ _
V 2j = ajj
_
; V 2l = 0
´
Therefore, we assume that the government has an higher disagreement payoﬀ
compared to the lobby. Our interpretation of these disagreement payoﬀs is that the
government is the only agent that can decide to realize a public project, but there
are several firms that could realize the project. Therefore, if the government and a
firm do not reach an agreement to realize the project at high cost, then government
can always realize the project at low cost. To keep the notation simpler, with no loss
of generality we also assume from now on that π(1, CH) = π ≥ 0 and π(1, CL) = 0
The following proposition characterizes the policy choice in the first mandate
under assumption 1:
Proposition 3 In the first mandate, if the share of surplus received by the lobby is
such that αl ≥ (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA
alB+π , then the high cost project is selected; otherwise,
the low cost project is selected.
18The main results of the model holds also under the alternative disagreement payoﬀs. We prefer
to illustrate the equilibrium arising in this particular case because we think it captures the outside
options of the two players in a more realistic way.
15
Now that we have fully characterized the policy choice, we can evaluate the ef-
fect of lobbying on policy outcomes. To simplify the notation, let’s define α =
(aAA−aAB)+CH+alA
alB+π the critical level of the lobby share in proposition 3. Remember
that, in absence of lobbying, from proposition 1 we know that the legislator always
chooses the low cost project . When transfers between lobby and legislator are al-
lowed, from proposition 3 we can see that there exist a sharing rule such that the high
cost project is selected, αl ≥ α. Therefore, we conclude that if the share of surplus
received by the lobby is suﬃciently high, then the policy choice under lobbying is
diﬀerent from the policy choice under no lobbying. On the other and, if the share of
surplus received by the lobby is not big enough, i.e. αl < α−, then lobbying doesn’t
aﬀect policies. In the next section we discuss the main properties of the political
equilibrium.
3.1 Electoral versus monetary incentives
The main objective of this exercise was to understand how the incentives provided by
voters and lobbies to legislators aﬀect policy outcomes. Using the characterization
of the political equilibrium we can now evaluate the eﬀect of the incentives on policy
outcomes. Voters and lobbies use diﬀerent instruments to influence the policy-maker.
Lobbies oﬀer monetary transfers and citizens oﬀer votes. Since voters and lobby
have opposite interests, legislators face the trade-oﬀ between current transfers from
lobbying and future gain from reelection. The main insight from our analysis is that
when transfers between lobby and legislators are not allowed, then the legislator faces
only electoral incentives and indeed the most preferred voters’ policy is implemented.
Hence, if we could forbid monetary transfers, the accountability problem will be
solved19. On the other hand, when transfers between lobby and legislator cannot be
forbidden, then both monetary and electoral incentives are provided. In this case, if
19This argument provides a rationale for the fact that in many countries lobby contributions are
illegal. However, this restriction on lobby contributions is diﬃcult to enforce as it is shown by the
evidence that in countries where lobby contributions are illegal transfers between lobby and legislators
still occur.
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the surplus captured by the lobby, αjS2
¡
1, CH , aB
¢
is big enough to compensate for
the electoral loss, then electoral discipline doesn’t work.
To summarize, when no lobbying occurs, then the legislator chooses the low cost
project. When the lobby and the legislator can share the surplus generated by the
policy using monetary transfers, then the high cost project can be chosen. The main
diﬀerence between a low cost and an high cost project is that the low cost project
implies lower profit but insures reelection of the incumbent legislator. Since incum-
bency generates the benefit from the selection of the policy type and the incumbent
can always choose the low cost project and be reelected, then for the high cost project
to be selected, the extra-profit it generates has to be big enough to compensate the
electoral loss of the incumbent. In our model the electoral loss of the legislator is
represented by the expression (aAA − aAB) + CH . When the legislator is replaced
by the challenger, he cannot choose anymore his most preferred policy type and he
suﬀers a loss (aAA − aAB), moreover becoming an ordinary citizens he has to pay
taxes CH . The lobby also faces an eﬀect from the incumbency change in the she will
not enjoy the benefit from the policy chosen by the incumbent20, alA. Furthermore,
as the lobby also has preferences for policy types, then for the high cost project to
be selected, the extra-profit has to compensate for the loss of the lobby.
Loosely speaking, the electoral loss can be interpreted as the cost of lobbying
and the surplus captured by the lobby group can be interpreted as the revenue of
lobbying. When the revenue from lobbying is higher then the cost of lobbying, then
the cost of lobbying is aﬀordable and therefore the lobby group obtains her most
preferred policy.
It is clear that, the electoral loss (cost of lobbying) crucially depends on how far
the incumbent is from the challenger on the ideological dimension. On the other
hand, the revenue generated by lobbying depends on the share of surplus received by
the lobby. The shares obtained by the two players are a reduced form representation
of their the bargaining power21. Therefore, the two key factors determining the
20However she enjoys the benefit αlalB.
21 In our model the shares are exogeneously given as we do not investigate the reasons behind
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strength of the electoral and the monetary incentives are the polarization of the
political race and the bargaining power of the lobby group. Given the polarization of
the political race22, if the lobbying activity generates a suﬃciently high surplus for
the lobby, then monetary transfers can be used to compensate for the electoral loss
and therefore monetary incentives are more eﬀective then electoral incentives. In this
case, the legislators chooses the policy preferred by the lobby and is not accountable to
voters. Hence the question arises. How can we increase the power of the electorate to
discipline the legislator? According to our model, in order to improve accountability
it is necessary to increase the cost of lobbying (electoral loss) or to decrease the
revenue from lobbying (lobby share). Two immediate instruments to increase the
cost and decrease the revenue of lobbying are the polarization of the political race
and the bargaining power of the legislator. However, if we take polarization and
bargaining power as given, another way to increase the cost of lobbying could be just
to increase the number of legislative bodies. Loosely speaking, if the lobby has to
compensate the electoral loss of two legislative bodies instead of one, then the cost
of lobbying should be higher and less likely to be aﬀordable. This very simple idea
is one of the explanations for multiple legislative bodies we observe in real word. In
the next section we will see if our model provides an explanation for this intuition.
the bargaining power of the two players. However, this bargaining power could be related to some
institutional features. In particular, the degree of control the legislator has on the legislative process
could aﬀect the bargaining power of the legislator in a crucial way. For example, when the duration of
a political mandate is uncertain because of endemic government instability, the legislator bargaining
position in spite of the lobby group could be weak. Similarly, coalitional governments that need to
engage in long and costly bargaining within the coalition in order to formulate a policy proposal may
not have strong bargaining position. Hence, we think that the analysis of the relationship between
bargaining power and characteristics of the decision-making process should be a matter of future
investigations.
22We will discuss later the polarization result.
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4 Bicameralism
In a bicameral system the parliament consists of two elected houses of representatives.
In our model two elected bodies should ”double” the electoral incentives. However,
the mere existence of two legislative bodies does not necessarily imply that the cost
of lobbying becomes double, since the decision power of the two bodies is important
in the negotiation between lobby and legislators. For example, if the second chamber
doesn’t have veto power, the bicameral system would work de facto as a unicameral
system23 and the cost of lobbying should not increase. Hence, if we want to analyze
the eﬀect of multiple legislative bodies on policy outcomes we have to be more precise
about the legislative power of each body.
For our purposes, we consider a bicameral system where the approval of both leg-
islative bodies is necessary to pass a policy proposal. Therefore, the second chamber
has the veto power.
Another important procedural detail to take into account when there are multi-
ple decision makers is the procedure followed when the two chambers disagree on a
policy proposal. For example, in most bicameral systems, the second chamber has
amendment rights and in case of disagreement the two chambers engage in a debate
before arriving to a final decision. This legislative procedure is the so called open
rule. On the other hand, there are cases where amendment rights are restricted24and
there are legislative procedures where the second legislator can only use veto power25.
The legislative procedure that allows veto power and excludes amendment right is
known as closed rule.
Finally, another aspect that we should take into account when there are multiple
decision makers is the party membership of the diﬀerent legislators. If the two legisla-
23This happen for example, in France where, when the two chambers do not agree, the Assembly
has the power of decision.
24For example in France deputy amendments cannot have the eﬀect of increasing spending and
decreasing revenue.
25An example of this can be found in the ”package vote” allowed by the french constitution. The
goverment can group articles and amendment selectively, excluding amendments that are opposed,
and require the assembly just a yes or no decision.
19
tive bodies share the same policy preferences, then they will have the same electoral
loss. However, if the two bodies disagree on the ideological dimension, then their
electoral loss will be diﬀerent and the electoral incentives could be less eﬀective26.
This aspect of a bicameral system may also be typical of coalitional governments,
where political actors with diﬀerent policy preferences need to find an agreement
over a policy. However, while coalitional government by definition are only formed
by diﬀerent parties, heterogeneity of party membership is not a general characteris-
tic of bicameral systems. Most importantly, multiple decision makers in coalitional
government only arise as a particular outcome of the electoral process, while under
bicameralism multiple decision makers will always be present, although their party
membership can be more or less heterogeneous depending on the electoral outcomes.
In some respects bicameralism is similar to other institutional arrangements fea-
turing multiple decision-makers. Examples of multiple policy-makers may be found
for example in federal states or under separation of power where the executive and
the legislative power are allocated to diﬀerent elected bodies. Hence, we need here
to clarify how bicameralism diﬀers from other forms of multiple decision-making.
The main characteristic of a bicameral system is the existence of two bodies
with legislative power. Therefore the essence of bicameralism is very diﬀerent from
separation of powers. In the first the same power is shared between two elected bodies,
while in the second two diﬀerent powers are attributed to diﬀerent bodies, with the
objective to provide check and balances in the decision-making process. In terms
of implications for the decision-making process, the diﬀerence between bicameralism
and separation of powers is very clear in the so called perfect bicameralism, where
the two chambers have amendment rights. In a perfect bicameral system each branch
of the parliament can amend a piece of legislation passed by the other, while under
separation of powers it is never the case that the executive can amend a piece of
legislation passed by a legislative body27.
26 In most bicameral systems the two chambers have the same type of majority. However, this
type of heterogeneity is possible and it is not an uncommon feature, as it is shown by the american
congress, where the house and the senate are often under the control of diﬀerent majority parties.
27When the second chamber does not have amendment rights, the diﬀerence between bicameralism
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While the principle of separation of powers lies at the hearth of modern parliamen-
tary democracies, bicameralism is typical only of some parliamentary democracies. In
some democratic systems the existence of the second chamber is associated with the
federal structure of the state, as typically the second chamber is meant to represent
the interests of the federal states. However, although bicameralism is often associated
with federalism, the two concept remain distinct. Federalism implies delegation of
power from the central to local governments on matters concerning local jurisdictions.
Hence, the process of delegation rather than sharing of power between bodies, and
the local rather than national nature of the power, makes federalism a very diﬀerent
concept as compared to bicameralism. Indeed federalism may be realized without
bicameralism and viceversa28.
In what follows we formally analyze the diﬀerent aspects of a bicameral systems.
First we consider a legislative procedure with two legislators having same policy
preferences and same proposal power (open rule). Then we will see what happens if
the two legislative bodies have diﬀerent proposal power (closed rule). Finally, we will
introduce heterogeneity of policy preferences to see how divergent tastes for policy
types may aﬀect the policy choice.
4.1 Open rule
We start our analysis with a bicameral system where the second legislator has veto
power and amendment right. In the political science jargon this is the so called open
rule. This type of legislative procedure implies that the two legislators have equal
proposal power29.
and separation of powers becomes less sharp. A presidential system with presidential veto power and
a bicameral system under closed rule would constitute an extreme example where bicameralism and
separation of power are almost indistinguishable, apart for the size of the institutional bodies.
28Canada constitute an example of federal state with de facto unicameralism, Italy is an example
of bicameral and non-federal state.
29 In the real world this allocation of proposal rights is widely used as, in general, the second
chamber is entitled with amendment right but the text of a bill needs to be approved in the same form
by both legislative bodies. More precisely, this is always true in the so called perfect bicameralism,
where a bill has to be passed in the same form by both chambers. This is for example the case of
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In formal terms, the bicameral system works in the following way. The legislative
process involves two legislators, denoted j1 and j2. We assume that the two legislators
have most preferred policy types aj1 and aj2 and, for simplicity, we do assume that
aj1 = aj2 . Therefore, given that j1 ∈ {A,B} and j2 ∈ {A,B}, we are assuming that
the two legislators are both either of type A or of type B30.
The two decision-makers decide sequentially on the policy. Therefore, the legisla-
tive process consists of two stages. In the first stage, the legislator j1 chooses a policy.
In the second stage, the legislator j2 either ratifies the choice of the first legislator or
proposes a diﬀerent policy. For a policy to be selected, both legislators must agree on
the policy. It is trivial to verify that in absence of lobbying the two chambers choose
the policy preferred by voters. On the other hand, when there is lobbying, a bar-
gaining process between the two legislators and the lobby will take place. Therefore,
the main diﬀerence between the unicameral and the bicameral system is that in the
latter three players have to agree on the policy to be chosen. Hence, for example, if
there is disagreement between the two chambers, the negotiation breaks down. The
outcome of this game depends on the disagreement payoﬀs of the three players and
we continue to assume that, in case of disagreement, two legislators can realize the
low cost project on their own, while the lobby group cannot realize any project.
In the second political mandate, the existence of the second legislator does not
change the policy outcome and proposition 2 still holds, i.e. in the second period the
high cost project is chosen. Therefore, we only need to analyze the policy choice in
the first mandate.
In the first mandate, the disagreement payoﬀs of the three players are the follow-
ing:
the US Congress and the italian parliament.
30This assumption simplifies the electoral process. Otherwise we would need to model the parties
selection of heterogeneous candidates in a more complex way. We think that this can be an interesting
extension of the model, in particular if we want to focus more on the link between electoral systems
and policy choice.
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µ _
V 1A2 = aAA + αA2S2
¡
1, CH
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;
_
V 1A1 = aAA + αA1S2
¡
1, CH
¢
;
_
V 1l = αlS2
¡
1, CH
¢¶
It is trivial to verify that lemma 2 holds also in the game with three players.
Therefore, according to the rationale we used to solve the bargaining in the unicameral
system, we can state the following for the bicameral system:
Lemma 4 If αl ≥
2[(aAA−aAB)+CH]+alA
alB+π , then the high cost project is chosen. Oth-
erwise, the low cost project is chosen.
Again, to simply the notation, let us define α = 2[(aAA−aAB)+C
H]+alA
alB+π the critical
value of the lobby share in the bargaining with three players31. Using lemma 4 and
the characterization of the equilibrium in the unicameral system, we can now compare
unicameralism and bicameralism to see how the two diﬀerent legislative procedures
aﬀect policy outcomes.
The following proposition summarizes the main results of our model:
Proposition 4 Given the share of surplus received by the lobby, αl, the following
result hold:
if the share received by the lobby is such that αl < α , then in both the unicameral
and the bicameral system the low cost policy is chosen ;
if the share received by the lobby is such that αl ≥ α , then in both the unicameral
and the bicameral system the high cost policy is chosen;
if the share received by the lobby is such that α ≤ αl < α , then in the bicameral
system the low cost policy is chosen, while the unicameral system the high cost policy
is chosen.
Our analysis confirms our initial intuition that the cost of lobbying under bicam-
eralism is higher then the cost of lobbying under unicameralism since the electoral
31Remember that we have previously defined the critical value of αl in the unicameral system as
α = [(aAA−aAB)+C
H ]+alA
alB+π
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loss of two legislators has to be compensated. This is formally shown by the simple
observation that the critical value of the lobby share under unicameralism lies below
the critical value under bicameralism, i.e. α < α. This implies that when one legisla-
tor is not accountable to voters, i.e. αl ≥ α , two legislators can be accountable, i.e.
αl < α. However the fact that α < α does not guarantee that the share received by
the lobby, αl, is inferior to the threshold α. Hence, when the share received by the
lobby is higher then the threshold level α , the high cost project is chosen also in the
bicameral system.
It is important to observe that the equilibrium policy outcome only depends on
the share received by the lobby or, equivalently, on the total share received by the
two legislators. Therefore, we can always find a total share such that the unicameral
and the bicameral system generates exactly the same policy outcome. In other words,
given the total share of surplus received by the government, two legislative bodies
choose the same policy that one legislative body would choose for the same share of
surplus32. This means that two legislators act exactly as one legislator and therefore
the division of the decision making process per se does not change the policy outcome.
Hence, the existence of multiple decision makers aﬀects the policy outcome only
because the conditions to reach an agreement change with the number of players.
Typically, as the number of players increases, it becomes more diﬃcult to reach an
agreement.
Finally, note also that when the cost of lobbying of a unicameral system is not
aﬀordable, i.e. αl < α, then one legislator is suﬃcient to guarantee accountability
and, at least for accountability purposes, there is no need to introduce a second
legislative body33
From proposition 4, we conclude that the existence of a second legislator with
same proposal power and same preferences of the first legislator makes more likely
32 In formal terms, for any share αl ≥ α, a single legislator chooses the same policy that two
legislator would choose for that share of surplus.
33However, accountability is not the unique reason justifying the existence of a second chamber as
in federal systems the second chamber is used to represent the interest of the federal states.
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the choice of the low cost project. However, it doesn’t guarantee the accountability to
the electorate since, even adding a second legislative body, the total cost of lobbying
can still be compensated. The unique case where the legislator is accountable to
voters without ambiguity is the case where the lobby doesn’t get any share of surplus.
Indeed it is trivial to verify that in this case the lobbying activity doesn’t generate
any revenue and therefore the electoral loss cannot be compensated:
Corollary 1 In the first mandate, if the lobby gets a share αl = 0, then in the
unicameral system the policy
¡
1, aA, C
L
¢
is chosen.
To summarize, when the lobby power is high then the surplus generated by lobby-
ing is big and therefore the electoral loss can be compensated. This implies that the
lobby obtains her most preferred policy and therefore the legislator is not accountable
to voters. Increasing the number of legislative bodies is a way to make more costly
the lobbying process. Therefore, our model provides a rationale for the existence of
multiple legislative bodies which is a common feature of many democratic systems.
However, our model also shows that this institutional device doesn’t necessarily solve
the accountability problem as the cost of lobbying can still be small enough compared
to the revenue to imply successful lobbying. Hence our analysis helps to reconcile the
contradiction between the theoretical justification for multiple legislative bodies and
the stylizes fact that bicameralism tends to be associated with higher government
corruption34.
4.2 closed rule, heterogeneous legislators and status quo
In this section we consider some variations of the bicameral system described in the
previous one to check the robustness of our results to alternative bicameral systems.
In the legislative setting we have just analyzed both legislative bodies have proposal
34According to several corruption indexes, bicameral systems as Italy, Greece, Spain and Belgium
show worse performance than unicameral systems like Finland, Denmark and Sweden. For a more
detailed discussion on the empirical evidence, see the section on the data.
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power. Suppose now that the second legislative body has veto power but not amend-
ment right. This is equivalent to say that only the first legislator has proposal power.
We would like to understand if, in terms of accountability, a bicameral system with
equal proposal power (open rule) is better then a bicameral system with restricted
proposal power (closed rule).
An important diﬀerence between the open rule and the closed rule is the procedure
to be followed after a disagreement between the two chambers. We know that, under
open rule, in case of disagreement, the two chambers engage in a debate before
delivering a final decision, while under closed rule there is no debate stage. Hence,
in the language of our model, if the two procedures imply a diﬀerence, this diﬀerence
must be related to the policy choice in case of disagreement. Remember that we have
assumed that in case of disagreement, the legislator has the possibility to realize the
low cost project. If there is just one legislator it seems plausible to assume that,
in case of disagreement, this legislator just decides to realize the low cost project.
On the other hand, if there are two legislators, then again in case of disagreement
they can decide to realize the low cost project, however, given the sequential nature
of the decision making process, the two legislator need to meet again to authorize
the realization of the low cost project. In this case, the debate stage in the open rule
procedure, can be interpreted as the device that allows the two legislators to choose
the low cost project after disagreement. If the two legislators after the disagreement
cannot meet again to authorize the realization of the low cost project, then no project
will be chosen. Hence, we say that the diﬀerence between the open rule and the closed
rule is precisely that under the closed rule procedure, in case of disagreement, the
legislators do not realize any project.
In formal terms this means that the disagreement payoﬀs of the three players are
the following:
µ _
V 2A2 = 0;
_
V
2
A1 = 0;
_
V 2l = 0
¶
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Therefore, comparing the open rule and the closed rule we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 5 Given the share of surplus received by the lobby, αl, then if the share
received by the lobby is such that:
2
£
(aAA − aAB) + CH
¤
+ alA
2aBB + alB + π
≤ αl <
2
£
(aAA − aAB) + CH
¤
+ alA
alB + π
in the bicameral system with open rule the low cost policy is chosen, while in the
bicameral system with closed rule the high cost policy is chosen.
Therefore, we conclude that in terms of accountability, a bicameral system where
both chambers have equal proposal power is better then a bicameral system where
the second chamber has only veto power.
Let’s move now to the analysis of the case of legislative bodies with diﬀerent
preferences for policy types. Since the electoral loss depends on the preferences of
the two legislators, we can anticipate that the electoral incentives will be weakened
by two legislators with opposite preferences. To see this formally, suppose that at
the beginning of the first mandate the two exogenously given legislators belong to
diﬀerent parties. Hence, each party controls one branch of the parliament. The
policy outcome in this case will be related to the rule selecting the policy type to
be implemented, given that the two bodies disagree. Let’s assume that the proposal
power belong to the first legislator, so that the policy type is imposed by the chamber
where the legislative process originates. Clearly the electoral incentives of the two
bodies are diﬀerent. The first legislator, when is reelected, chooses his most preferred
policy type and gets lobby transfers, while the second legislator just obtains lobby
transfers. Let’s assume that the first legislator belongs to party A and the second
legislator belongs to party B. Formally, the policy choice is the following:
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Lemma 4 if αl ≥ 2C
H+alA
alB+π , then the high cost project is chosen, otherwise the low
cost project is chosen.
Since the term 2C
H+alA
alB+π can be interpreted as the cost of lobbying, comparing the
unicameral system and the bicameral system with heterogeneous legislators, we can
see that bicameralism does not necessarily increase the cost of lobbying! Indeed, if
the political race is polarized enough, the opposite holds:
Proposition 6 suppose that the ideological distance between the incumbent A and
the challenger B is such that CH < (aAA − aAB), then the following holds:
if the share received by the lobby is such that 2C
H+alA
alB+π ≤ αl < α, then in the
bicameral system the high cost policy is chosen, while in the unicameral system the
low cost policy is chosen;
if the share received by the lobby is such that αl ≤ 2C
H+alA
alB+π < α, then in the
bicameral system and in the unicameral system the low cost policy is chosen.
The explanation for this result is the following. When legislators have opposite
policy preferences, they have diﬀerent electoral losses. In particular, the loss due to
the payment of taxes is the same for both legislators. Regarding the policy type, the
legislator that can select his most preferred type, suﬀers a loss when he is replaced
by a challenger. On the contrary, the legislator with opposite preferences gains from
the change of incumbent because, even if he will not be in oﬃce, he will enjoy the
policy choice of a challenger sharing his own preferences for the policy type. The
result is that the loss from policy type of the first legislator is oﬀset by the gain in
policy type of the second legislator. Therefore the only source of electoral loss will
be the payment of taxes. On the other hand, in the unicameral system, the cost
of lobbying includes the loss in terms of policy type. When this loss is important
because the political race is polarized, then the unicameral system provides better
electoral incentives then the bicameral system.
The concept of two chambers controlled by diﬀerent parties is very similar to the
idea of divided government in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). However, although in
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Alesina and Rosenthal divided government works in favor of the median voter, in our
model this is not the case. Specifically, Alesina and Rosenthal state ”divided govern-
ment occurs because moderate voters like it, and they take advantage of ”checks and
balances” to achieve moderation. In dividing government, the voters force parties to
compromise: divided government is a remedy to political polarization”. Our conclu-
sions on polarization and divided government are diﬀerent for several reasons. First,
our policy space is multidimensional, and therefore beside the ideological dimension
on which voters have diﬀerent preferences, there is a monetary dimension on which
voters have identical preferences. Second, an interest group with opposing interests on
the monetary dimension bribes legislators to take a policy decision against voters in-
terests’. Finally, as legislators are policy-motivated on the ideological dimension, the
cost of bribing is increasing in ideological distance between the incumbent legislator
and the opponent. Hence, although the median voter looses from party polariza-
tion on the ideological dimension, he gains on the monetary dimension when party
polarization makes the legislator accountable. At this point we do not ask whether
the median voter prefers a polarized political race with accountable legislators to a
non-polarized political race with corrupt legislators, since we assume that the polar-
ization is exogenous and we examine the consequences in terms of accountability35.
Indeed, to avoid this issue we also prevented the median voter from actually divid-
ing the government in terms of policy choice on the ideological dimension, since we
assumed that the chamber where the legislative process initiates dictates the choice
of the ideological dimension, so that the monetary component is the only object of
negotiation.
To complete this analysis on bicameralism and accountability, we would like to
discuss another example where bicameralism is neutral. Suppose that we have an
economic environment where there is already a policy in place (status quo policy).
Suppose that voters prefers some other policy diﬀerent from the status quo, hence
they would like a reform. On the other hand, the policy preferred by the lobby is
35 In a companion paper (Testa 2003) we show that there are cases where the median voter prefers
the polarized political race and hence we will prove how party polarization may arise in equilibrium.
29
the status quo. For the reform to be implemented, both legislator must agree. In
case of disagreement the status quo policy remains in place. In this case, if we have
a bicameral system, voters need the approval of two legislative bodies to obtain the
reform, while the lobby just needs the negative decision of one legislative body to
maintain the status quo. In formal terms, when there is lobbying for the status quo,
the lobby has to bargain only with one legislator, since all she needs is that one
legislator chooses a policy diﬀerent from the other. Therefore, the lobby obtains the
status quo under the same conditions she would obtain her most preferred policy in
the unicameral case. It is clear that in this case the existence of a second legislator is
neutral since the cost of lobbying doesn’t change compared to the one legislator case.
Hence, in the case of lobbying for the status quo, the number of legislators does not
help to solve the accountability problem.
To summarize, the main results of this analysis on legislative procedures and
accountability are the following. When the surplus from lobbying is high enough
to compensate the electoral loss, then bicameralism could make lobbying more ex-
pensive, thereby increasing accountability. In this case, two legislative bodies with
identical policy preferences and same proposal power (open rule) represent the best
bicameral system for accountability purposes. A bicameral system with legislators
belonging to the same party and proposal power of the first legislator (closed rule)
still improves accountability, but to a minor extent compared to the equal power sys-
tem. As legislators become heterogeneous in party membership, electoral incentives
from policy type vanish and therefore bicameralism is not necessarily better than
unicameralism. Finally, bicameralism is neutral for accountability when the interest
group is lobbying for a policy that is already in place (status quo policy) because, to
maintain the status quo policy, the lobby just needs to obtain a negative decision of
one legislator.
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5 Polarization and accountability
The objective of this paper was to compare diﬀerent institutional frameworks in order
to understand which legislative arrangement make the government more accountable
to voters. However, our model, stressing the diﬀerence of incentives provided to the
policy makers by voters and lobbies, also provides useful insight about other aspects
of the political game that may aﬀect accountability. In particular, it shows that there
is a precise relationship between the polarization of the political race and the ability
of voters to discipline legislators.
To see how polarization aﬀects accountability, consider the characterization of the
equilibrium in the one legislator case. In terms of policy outcomes, diﬀerent equilibria
arise in which
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
,
¡
1, CL, aj
¢
are selected. Therefore, in some cases voters
are able to discipline the policy maker obtaining their first most preferred policy
outcome,
¡
1, CL, aj
¢
. On the other hand, we also observe cases where the lobby gets
his most preferred policy outcome
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
. Which factors make the incumbent
more or less accountable to the voters? We know that, given the objective function of
the policy maker, voters and lobby provide diﬀerent kind of incentives, respectively
electoral and monetary incentives. The electoral incentives work via the individual
preferences for policy types: policy-makers are policy-motivated actors on the ideo-
logical dimension of the policy and therefore they value the reelection as a mean to
obtain their most preferred policy type. Hence, when replaced by a challenger, an
incumbent policy-maker incurs into a utility loss because the challenger will choose a
policy type diﬀerent from the incumbent’s most preferred type. Monetary transfers
can compensate this loss. Consequently, when the lobby oﬀers a payment to obtain
the policy, the transfer must be suﬃcient to compensate the loss the incumbent will
suﬀer being replaced by a challenger.
Clearly the electoral loss will depend on the distance between the incumbent and
the challenger ideological position: the higher the distance, the higher the loss. When
the electoral loss is higher than the surplus from lobbying, then the legislator will
choose the policy preferred by voters. Therefore we conclude that polarization in
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party positions has a positive eﬀect on the accountability of policy-makers to voters.
Furthermore, our model shows that the polarization result is robust to alternative
specifications of the bargaining game (alternative disagreement payoﬀs).
To summarize, one result of our analysis is that, when a lobby is trying to get
influence on policies, the polarization of party positions is the key ingredient of the
political race that allows the voters to discipline policy-makers. Another conclusion
we draw from our model is that the degree of polarization necessary to keep the
policy-maker accountable is increasing in the bargaining power of the lobby group.
Therefore, if we believe the anecdotal evidence that the lobbying eﬀectiveness varies
across countries, this model suggests two factors which could explain diﬀerences across
countries: the degree of polarization in party positions and the distribution of bar-
gaining power between lobbies and policy-makers.
To complete this discussion on the polarization result, a clarification on the notion
of polarization and a comparison with the related literature is in order here. In our
model, the polarization refers to the location on the ideological dimension of the
candidates competing for the election. We do not make any particular assumption
on the polarization of voters with respect to the ideological dimension of the policy.
The reason for this choice is that what really matters from our perspective is not the
polarization of individual preferences but the polarization of selected policies. Since
selected policies are the result of the individual preferences aggregation through the
political process, our focus is on the political process. At this stage we do not study
yet how parties choose to locate, but taking for given that diﬀerent locations on
the ideological dimension are possible, we discuss the eﬀect of diﬀerent equilibrium
locations on the policy outcome and we show how diﬀerent equilibrium locations
aﬀect accountability.
To see that the polarization of policies more than the polarization of preferences
is the crucial issue, suppose that voters are polarized on the ideological dimension.
The crucial assumption that guarantees the robustness of our results to diﬀerent
distributions of voters is the political salience of the non-ideological dimension of
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the policy36. Therefore, when we introduce diﬀerent distributions we have verify the
restrictions on individual preferences which insure that the assumption 1 is satisfied.
When voters are not polarized, we know that the symmetry of the candidates around
the median voters guarantees that the non-ideological dimension is politically salient.
Figure (a) illustrates this case. Suppose now that voters are polarized as in figure (b)
and figure (c). In the first case of figure (b), the symmetry of A and B around the
median voter m, again implies that C is politically salient. In the case of figure (c),
the symmetry is not suﬃcient to insure that a citizen preferring A to B on ideological
ground will switch his vote from the incumbent A to the challenger B if the challenger
is oﬀering a policy at a low cost while the incumbent is oﬀering a policy at high cost.
Therefore, for C to be politically salient under any distribution of voters, we have
to assume that voters’ preferences are such that the gain from obtaining the most
preferred policy cost is higher than the gain from obtaining the most preferred policy
type. In more formal terms, given the candidates A and B, let i be a citizen with
preferences for the policy types such that aiA > aiB with aii ≥ aij for i 6= j.
36Remember that the political salience assumptions is | amA − amm |=| amB − amm | .
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 figure (b)
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figure (c)
 A          m          B
Figure 2 - distribution of preferences
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The following assumption implies that C ∈
©
CL, CH
ª
is politically salient:
Assumption 2 :
¯¯
CL − CH
¯¯
> |aiA − aiB|
Provided that C is politically salient, it is clear that the positive eﬀect of a
political race where candidates are polarized on the ideological dimension will be
preserved when citizens also are polarized. Indeed, voters’ polarization could be
assumed as a base for party polarization as in Besley-Burgess (2000). However, in
Besley-Burgess (2000) it is also shown that the eﬀect of polarization is ambiguous; on
one hand polarization is necessary to provide electoral incentives, on the other if the
voters that have an interest to punish/reward the policy-maker for his performance
on the non-ideological issue are too polarized on the ideological one, then it is less
likely that they are willing to swing their vote on the ideological dimension. This
diﬀerence on the polarization result depends on the diﬀerent assumptions on the
information setting. In Besley-Burgess (2000) there are two types of policy makers -
”good” and ”bad” - randomly selected. Rational voters anticipate the policy outcome
each candidate would deliver but they remain uncertain on the policy maker type.
Therefore, whether or not a rational voter will switch his voting from a candidate
sharing his own ideology to a candidate having an opposite ideology depends on
the diﬀerence in the likelihood they are going to choose their most preferred non-
ideological policy dimension, that is in the likelihood they are good. On the contrary,
in our model, since there is no uncertainty about the non-ideological dimension of
the policy that will be selected through the bargaining process, the assumption of
political salience is suﬃcient to switch the vote from a policy maker choosing an high
cost to a policy maker choosing a low cost, for every ideological location of the two
candidates. In terms of Besley-Burgess (2000), this would equivalent to say that in
our model citizens know that the challenger and the incumbent are of the same type
because they are both willing to accept a future lobby proposal . Therefore the unique
variable aﬀecting the reappointment decision is the cost delivered by the incumbent
in the first period; punishing the incumbent that accepted a lobby proposal is the
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unique instrument voters have to induce the incumbent to reject a first period lobby
proposal. Hence we conclude that when policy makers cannot build in reputation,
the polarization of the candidates participating to the political race unambiguously
increases government’s accountability.
As a final remark, our analysis allow us to interpret from a diﬀerent perspective
the results of other streams of literature focusing on the implication of polarized
citizens’ preferences for the public decision making. For example, in Alesina-Baqir-
Easterly (1999) it is shown that the polarization of individual preferences for diﬀerent
types of public good has a negative impact on the amount of public good provided
when the tax level and the amount of public good are decided by majority voting.
The explanation for this result is that the distance between the selected policy type
(median) and the policy type preferred by each individual is increasing in the distance
of each individual from the median voter. Therefore, the more polarized the society,
the less satisfied the individuals are with the policy preferred by the median voter
and the less willing the citizens will be to devote taxes for public spending. Note
that in Alesina-Baqir-Easterly (1999), even though the society is polarized, there is
no polarization in the political race. Therefore, what drives the result in the model is
not only the polarization of the society but also the convergence of political parties
to the median voter. In other words, the polarization of citizens’ preferences is not
suﬃcient to create competition among them unless the political race is such that the
selected policy type is the median one.
To conclude, if we want to evaluate the consequences of polarized individual pref-
erences for public decision making we have to be aware of the fact that polarization
in society is diﬀerent from polarization in the political race; how do we go from a
more or less polarized society to a more or less polarized political race is a question
that we do not address in this analysis37. However, since polarization in political
race ultimately determines selected policies, it is important to understand how it
37The issue of endogenous party polarization has been analysed in a recent paper by J. Svensson,
”Controlling Spending: Electoral Competition, Polarization and Endogeneous Platforms”, mimeo
April 2000.
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aﬀects policy-maker’s incentives and performance. Therefore, we study the eﬀect of
polarization in political race (for any given polarization in society) and we find an
unambiguously positive eﬀect on policy-makers’ accountability. The non-ambiguity
result rests on the assumption of voters’ perfect information on the non-ideological
dimension of the policy that will be selected by policy-makers.
6 Empirical Analysis
In this section we will present an empirical investigation to verify the consistency our
model with the data.
To carry on an empirical test of our theoretical predictions we collected data
on bicameralism, party polarization and legislator accountability for 43 democratic
countries. Our main data source is the CDI-World Bank Database on Political Insti-
tutions. In our sample, half of the countries are unicameral and half are bicameral,
as it is shown in table 1. A country is classified as bicameral when the two existing
chambers have eﬀective legislative power38. For bicameral systems, we do not have
any information on whether they use the open rule or the closed rule in the legislative
process, hence this aspect of our model cannot be captured by the data.
Concerning the data on parties, the Database on Political Institutions classifies
government and opposition parties as center, left and right. Based on this informa-
tion, we can construct an index of party polarization measuring the distance between
the incumbent party and the challenger. Since in our sample we have both majori-
tarian and proportional systems, we do not always have a unique incumbent party
and a unique challenger, as it would be in a two-parties systems with majoritarian
electoral rule. Therefore, to measure the ideological distance between incumbent and
challenger in the spirit of our model, we decided to take the distance between the
major party in government and the major party in opposition as a measure of party
38Hence, for example, the United Kingdom is classified as a Unicameral system since the second
chamber has restricted legislative power.
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polarization. We construct then an index that takes value zero, one or two, depend-
ing on how the two parties are labeled on the center, left, right spectrum. Hence, an
index of zero means that the two parties have the same label, an index of two means
that one party is left and the other is right, and index equal to one means that one
party is labeled center and the other is either left or right. The DPI also provides us
with information on the heterogeneity of legislators policy preferences that is crucial
in our model to determine the eﬀectiveness of bicameralism. In particular, for our
purpose we can use the index of legislature fractionalization defined as the chance
that two random draws will produce legislators from diﬀerent parties. We also have
a measure of the maximum diﬀerence of orientation among government parties (that
takes again values between zero and two) and we know if the party of the executive
has the control of all the relevant houses.
Besides data on political institutions and parties, we need a measure of legislators’
accountability. Ideally, we would like to compare public projects of the same type in
diﬀerent countries to see whether the same policy is implemented at diﬀerent cost.
So far, however, we are not aware of data from which we could extract this type of
information. Therefore, we decided to use corruption indexes as an indirect measure
of legislators’ accountability. Several corruption indexes are available from diﬀerent
sources39for the ’80s and ’90s, however to match the corruption data with the data
on political polarization and to obtain a sample that was not restricted to the OECD
countries, we can use only one index of corruption. The corruption index we use is the
Knack and Keefer measure of corruption (1980-89). This corruption index measures
corruption on a 0-6 scale assigning a score to each country, where 1 is assigned to the
most corrupt country and 6 to the least corrupt.
Finally, we collected data to control for other relevant socio-economic and ge-
ographic factors that, according to the existing literature (La Porta et all (1999)
and Treisman 2000), may influence corruption. These includes gross national income
percapita (GNI percapita), population, trade as a percentage of the GDP, education,
39Two main sources of corruption indexes are Transparency International and the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
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religion, civil and political rights, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, geographic dummies,
colonial origin and legal origin40.
In table 2 we report the correlations between the main variables. We can see that
higher GNI percapita is associated with higher education, better civil and political
rights (freedom) and lower corruption. The corruption index is also strongly positively
correlated with the level of education and the degree of freedom41. Concerning the
main variables we are interested in this work, political polarization and bicameralism
are positively correlated with the corruption index, with the first variable being more
correlated than the second to the corruption index.
In table 3, we report the means for the corruption index and several other vari-
ables according to the degree of polarization of the political system, the parliament
characteristics (unicameral and bicameral) and the colonial origin. The mean de-
gree of corruption for countries with no polarization is higher than for countries with
medium and high degree of polarization. The diﬀerence is substantial and statisti-
cally significant. The mean corruption is slightly higher in unicameral systems than
in bicameral, although the mean diﬀerence is very small and not significant. With
respect to the colonial origin, colonies have a higher corruption than non colonies.
Among colonies, Spanish colonies have higher corruption than UK colonies. In ta-
ble 4a and table4b we report the corruption ranking for the overall sample and the
corruption ranking by geographic location (means).
We can know try to test the main results of our model. Our model predicts
that the polarization of the political race has a positive eﬀect on the legislator’s
accountability, while the eﬀect of bicameralism on accountability is ambiguous. On
one hand bicameralism, increasing the cost of lobbying, can increase accountability.
On the other hand , if multiple legislators have diﬀerent policy preferences, then
bicameralism can oﬀset the electoral incentives leading to less accountability then
40The detailed description of the data is provided in appendix. For a detailed discussion of the
eﬀects of religious tradition, legal culture and colonial heritage on corruption see Triesman, Daniel,
[2000], The Causes of Corruption: A Cross National Study, Journal of Public Economics, 76, 399-457
41The variable freedom measures the civil and political rights of a country.
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unicameralism, especially in the case of a quite polarized electoral race. Therefore, the
eﬀectiveness of bicameralism depends both on the policy preferences of the legislators
and on the political polarization. In summary, we would like to test the following
results:
H1: Party polarization decreases corruption.
H2: Bicameralism decreases corruption when multiple legislators have the same
policy preferences (for any degree of party polarization).
H3: Bicameralism is neutral or decreases corruption when multiple legislators
have diﬀerent policy preferences and party polarization is low.
H4: Bicameralism increases corruption when multiple legislators have diﬀerent
policy preferences and party polarization is high.
The main variables of our interest are therefore party polarization, bicameral-
ism and policy preferences of legislators measured by the legislature fractionaliza-
tion. From our data, we construct three dummies of party polarization, namely pol0
, pol1, pol2, for the three values of polarization (zero, one and two) and a dummy
for the bicameralism denoted bic, taking value zero when a country is unicameral
and one when a country is bicameral. Our model suggests that besides the direct
eﬀect of polarization and bicameralism on corruption, there is an interaction between
bicameralism and polarization and bicameralism and fractionalization. We take this
into account introducing in our regressions interaction terms between bicameralism
and polarization and bicameralism and fractionalization. Hence, denoting corr the
dependent variable (corruption index), frac the measure of legislature fractionaliza-
tion and ∆ the vector of all the other socio-economic controls, the equation we want
to estimate takes the following form:
corr = α1pol1 + α2pol2 + βbic+ γ1pol1bic+ γ2pol2bic+ δfrac+ λfracbic+ θ∆+ ²
We report in table 5 the results of our estimations. In the first two columns
we report the estimated coeﬃcient of the regression without the interaction between
fractionalization and bicameralism. The coeﬃcients of party polarization, α1 and α2,
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are positive as we expected but significant only for the highest degree of polarization
(polarization=2). The coeﬃcient of bicameralism, β, is also positive, although not
very significant. The two coeﬃcients of the interacted terms, γ1 and γ2 , are negative,
but only the interaction between high polarization and bicameralism is significant.
Note that, the sum of the coeﬃcients (β + γ1 + γ2) is negative, hence when party po-
larization is high, bicameralism increases corruption. From our model we know that
this is possible if multiple legislators have heterogenous policy preferences that coun-
terbalance political incentives. Hence, if the negative eﬀect is due to heterogeneity
of policy preferences, we expect that introducing the interaction between fraction-
alization and bicameralism, this new term will entirely explain the negative eﬀect
of bicameralism on the corruption index. In columns (3) and (4) of the table 5 we
report the coeﬃcient when both interactions are introduced. As we can see, the coef-
ficient of the interaction term between fractionalization and bicameralism is negative
and significant. Importantly, once we introduce the interaction between bicameral-
ism and fractionalization, the sum of the coeﬃcients (β + γ1 + γ2) becomes positive,
meaning that bicameralism associated with high polarization decreases corruption
if legislators have homogeneous policy preferences. On the other hand the sign of
the overall coeﬃcient of bicameralism with fractionalization, (β + γ1 + γ2 + λfrac),
depends on whether the political race is polarized or not. If we consider the case
were the political race is not polarized, i.e. Pol1 = 0 and Pol2 = 0, then we obtain
that the coeﬃcient of bicameralism (β + λfrac) is always positive and decreasing
with the degree of fractionalization. Conversely, if the political race is polarized, i.e.
Pol1 = 1 and Pol2 = 1, we obtain that the coeﬃcient is negative and decreasing with
fractionalization. Figure 3 represents a graph showing how the coeﬃcient of bicam-
eralism estimated in column (4) changes with the fractionalization of the legislature,
depending on whether the political race is polarized or not.
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Using table 5 we can compare the results for alternative specifications, where we
introduce a number of political, socio-economic, geographic and colonial controls.
Some results are not robust to alternative specifications. In particular, column (4)
shows that the results on party polarization, bicameralism and fractionalization are
robust to the introduction of all the socio-economic controls42. Column (5) shows
the eﬀect of introducing other political controls such as the maximum degree of
heterogeneity of government parties (govfractio) and whether or not the party of
42The Socio-Economic controls we use are gross national income per capita, population (log), trade
as a percentage of GDP, civil and political right, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, religion and regional
dummies. We dropped the education because of the very high correlation with the gross national
income percapita. The GNI percapita and trade as a percentage of GDP are the most significant
coeﬃcients with positive sign. The degree of freedom has also a positive sign and is not completely
insignificant. The ethnolinguistic fragmentation has a negative sign and is not significant. All the
religious controls have positive sign except for the Muslim dummy. Among the geographic controls,
the Latin America dummy is the most significant with a negative sign. The detailed tables with all
the coeﬃcients and t-values for religion an regional dummies are reported in table 6 and table7.
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the executive controls all the relevant houses (allhouse)43. As we can see, most of
the coeﬃcients of our political/institutional controls are not aﬀected, apart from the
coeﬃcient of party polarization that becomes slightly less significant. In columns (6)
to (9) we present the regressions with all the socio-economic controls and the colonial
controls44. When we add the colonial controls, the size and signs of all the coeﬃcient
of the main political controls (polarization, bicameralism and interacted terms) are
not aﬀected, however their significance drops substantially 45, with the exception of
the coeﬃcient of high polarization and the interaction between bicameralism and high
polarization, that remain significant.
As a final remark, this empirical test can be aﬀected by endogeneity problems
that are common to all these type of analysis. Nevertheless, we carried on this
exercise in the spirit of the existing empirical literature to have a sense of whether
the correlations in the data show some consistency with the predictions of our model.
Hence, based on our analysis of the data we conclude that the empirical findings are
consistent with our theoretical results.
7 Summary of results and conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to provide a theoretical framework to study the eﬀect
of legislative arrangements on policy outcomes and legislators accountability. Leg-
islators are expected to serve voters interests; however, the electorate interests may
be in conflict with lobbies interests which exert pressure on legislators. If pressure
groups successfully lobby legislators, then the accountability of the legislators to the
voters is compromised. The question to which this paper seeks an answer is whether
43The heterogeneity of government parties has a negative eﬀect on corruption, while the fact that
the party of the executive has the control of the relavant houses ha positive eﬀect. None of the two
coeﬃcient is significant though.
44The colonial origin and legal origin dummies have all positive signs and the colonial origin
coeﬃcients are the most significant. The coeﬃcients and t-statistics for these variables are reported
in table 7.
45These results are not surprising given the small size of our sample. Also, as we can see, those
coeﬃcients never become completely unsignificant.
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or not legislative arrangements aﬀect the lobby power to distort policy choices from
the most preferred voters outcomes. We compare two types of legislative arrange-
ments: unicameralism and bicameralism. In a unicameral system the legislature is
characterized by a unique legislative body deciding on the policy; in a bicameral
system two legislative bodies have to pass a policy proposal. An advantage of the
unicameral system is the faster approval of a policy proposal. However, the advocates
of the bicameral system argue that, a second legislative body, making lobbying more
diﬃcult, may improve accountability. In other words, when lobbies trade money for
policy favors, two legislative bodies should be more diﬃcult to buy than one. If this
view was correct, we should expect that bicameralism increases accountability. Our
theoretical analysis deals formally with this question using a model where legisla-
tors interact with lobby through a bargaining process and with voters by means of
elections.
The main result of the model is that the share of surplus captured by lobby and
the polarization of the political race are the major determinant of the policy choice.
In particular, when the share of surplus received by the lobby is suﬃciently high to
compensate the electoral loss, then the lobby obtains here most preferred policy and
the legislator is not accountable to voters. In this case, the introduction of a second
legislator, increasing the electoral loss, may improve accountability. However, the
eﬀectiveness of the bicameral systems crucially depends on the rule governing the
functioning of the two elected bodies and on the policy preferences of the decision-
makers. The decision power of the two bodies is particularly important. We find that,
for accountability purposes, two legislative bodies with equal decision power provide
the best incentives. Two legislative bodies with diﬀerent decision power still improve
accountability but to a minor extent then two legislative bodies with equal powers.
However, if the two legislative bodies are controlled by opposite parties, most of
the electoral incentives vanish and bicameralism could be worse then unicameralism
for accountability purposes. We also carried on an empirical test of our model and
the evidence from a cross-country analysis including 43 democracies with diﬀerent
legislative structures (unicameral and bicameral) is consistent with our theoretical
44
findings.
Another an important message of our analysis is that, if the two legislative bod-
ies have very low bargaining power or if the political race is not polarized, then the
bicameral system doesn’t necessarily solve the accountability problem. Hence our
study suggests that, even when bicameralism is not detrimental to accountability,
focussing on this institutional feature can be misleading since, to solve the account-
ability problem, priority should be given to other institutional rules that may increase
the bargaining power of the legislator. This consideration suggests that further in-
vestigations on this matter should be undertaken.
A second important result of our model is that legislator’s accountability is also
related to the characteristics of the political race. Since legislators are policy moti-
vated on the type dimension, voters can provide electoral incentives. We show that
polarization in party position increases accountability. The polarization result is
robust to the alternative specifications of the bargaining game and the degree of po-
larization necessary to keep the legislator accountable is increasing in the bargaining
power of the lobby group. Our analysis focuses on the polarization of the political
race, where this polarization is exogenously given. We discuss the eﬀect introducing
a polarized electorate but we do not study how the polarization of the electorate may
aﬀect polarization in candidates’ equilibrium location with respect to the ideological
dimension. The relationship between polarization in society and polarization in the
political race remains an important open question that requires further investigation.
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Appendix
Proposition 1
Proof.
In in t = 2 we observe that
Vj
¡
1, CL
¢
= Vj
¡
1, CH
¢
and in period 1 we observe that VA
¡
1, CL
¢
≡ 2aAA ≥ VA
¡
1, CH
¢
≡ aAA + aAB − CH .
Lemma 1
Proof.
The inequalities follows from the pairs of disagreement payoﬀs:³ _
V 2j =
_
0;V 2l = 0
´
,
³ _
V 2j = aAA
_
;V 2l = alA
´
,³ _
V 2j = aAA
_
;V 2l = 0
´
,
³ _
V 2j = 0
_
;V 2l = alA
´
_
V 2j = ajj ,
_
V 2l = alj , S
2 (1, aj , C) = ajj + π (1, C)
and π
¡
1, CH
¢
> 0, π
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0,π (0, 0) = 0.
since, S1
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
≥ S1
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
≥ S1 (0, 0, 0), hence
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
is the surplus max-
imizing policy.
Lemma 2
Proof.
The inequalities follows from the four possible pairs of disagreement payoﬀs in the first
period :µ
_
V
1
j = αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,µ
_
V
1
j = aAA + αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = alA + αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,µ
_
V
1
j = aAA + αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,-
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µ
_
V
1
j = αjS2
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
;
_
V
t
l = alA + αlS2
¡
1, CH , al
¢¶
,
the equilibrium voting strategy, Σj (P,C, aj) =
£
σij
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σij (0, 0) = 1,σij
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
and the assumption on profits, π
¡
1, CH
¢
> 0, π
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0,π (0, 0) = 0.
Lemma 3
Proof.
From lemma 2 , S1
¡
1, aj , C
H
¢
≥ S1
¡
1, aj , C
L
¢
if and only if αl ≥ (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA−
_
V
2
l
S2(1,aj ,CH)−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
.
Proposition 3
Proof.
The proposition follows from lemma 3 and assumption 1 .
Lemma 4
Proof.
the proof of lemma 4 is as lemma 3.
Proposition 4
Proof.
Proposition 4 follows from proposition 3 and lemma 4.
Proposition 5
Proof.
This proposition follows from lemma 3 and the two following assumptions:
1)under open rule the disagreement payoﬀs are:
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µ _
V 2A2 = aAA;
_
V
2
A1 = aAA;
_
V 2l = 0
¶
µ _
V 1A2 = aAA + αA2S2
¡
1, CH
¢
;
_
V 1A1 = aAA + αA1S2
¡
1, CH
¢
;
_
V 1l = αlS2
¡
1, CH
¢¶
2) under closed rule the disagreement payoﬀs are:
µ _
V 2A2 = 0;
_
V
2
A1 = 0;
_
V 2l = 0
¶
µ _
V 1A2 = αA2S2
¡
1, CH
¢
;
_
V 1A1 = αA1S2
¡
1, CH
¢
;
_
V 1l = αlS2
¡
1, CH
¢¶
Lemma 4
Proof.
Lemma 4 follows from proposition 3 and from the symmetry assumption (aAA − aAB) =
(aBB − aBA)
Proposition 6
Proof.
Proposition 6 follows from proposition 3, lemma 4 and the observation that (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA
alB+π ≤
2CH+alA
alB+π if and only if C
H < (aAA − aAB).
52
1. Equilibrium voting strategy
Definition:
An equilibrium of the voting game is a vector Σ∗j (P,C, aj) of individual voting decision
σ∗ij (P,C, aj) such that, given the sharing rules αj and αl:
Vij
¡
P,C, aj ,Σ
∗
j (.)
¢
≥ Vij (P,C, ajt ,Σjt (.)) ∀Σj (P,C, aj) 6= Σ∗j (P,C, aj)
Proof.
Let A be the first period incumbent and B the challenger. In what follows we prove that
Σ∗A =
£
σ∗mA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σ∗mA (0, 0) = 1,σ∗mA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
satisfies the following definition of
equilibrium voting strategy:
ViA (P,C, aA,Σ
∗
A (.)) ≥ ViA (P,C, aA,ΣA (.)) ∀ΣA (P,C, aA) 6= Σ∗A (P,C, aA)
•Alternative voting strategy : ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1,σmA (0, 0) = 1,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
Under the voting rule ΣA (.), choosing
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
in the first period, the policy maker
A remains in power in the second period. Under this voting rule, using lemma 2 we know
that the agreement on
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
is always reached. On the other hand, if σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
=
0, creating an electoral loss, depending on the parameters of the model,either
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
or
¡
1, CL, aA
¢
can be reached. .In the second period, we know from proposition 2 that,
independently of the voting strategy, the policy choice is always
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
. Note that, if
αl ≥ (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA−
_
V
2
l
S2(1,aj ,CH)−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
, the voter obtains the same pay-oﬀ under the two alternative
voting strategies, hence he is indiﬀerent between, σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0 and σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1.
On the other hand, if αl < (aAA−aAB)+C
H+alA−
_
V
2
l
S2(1,aj ,CH)−
_
V 2l −
_
V 2B
then the payoﬀ under the voting strategy
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0 is higher then the payoﬀ under the voting strategy σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1,
Therefore, we conclude that:
ViA (P,C, aA,Σ
∗
A (.)) ≥ ViA (P,C, aA,ΣA (.))
therefore ΣA (.) is not an equilibrium strategy.
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•Alternative voting strategy : ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
Under the voting rule ΣA (.) the incumbent is never reappointed. Therefore, the pol-
icy
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
and
¡
1, CL, aA
¢
generate the same electoral loss. Given that
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
generates higher profits, clearly an agreement on
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
will always be reached. In
the second period, we know from proposition 2 that, independently of the voting strategy,
the policy choice is always
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
. Therefore, the voter gets the policy
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
in
both periods. Using the voting strategy ΣA(.) the voter can obtain either
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
or¡
1, CL, aA
¢
in the first period and
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
in the second period. Therefore, ΣA (.) =£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
is not an equilibrium voting strategy.
•Alternative voting strategy : ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
Following the previous proof, again we compare ΣA (.) and Σ∗A (.). Using lemma 2 we
can say that, S
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
> S (0, 0, 0) under the voting strategy ΣA (.) does not imply
S
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
> S (0, 0, 0) under the voting strategy Σ∗A (.). Since when S
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
<
S (0, 0, 0), an agreement on
¡
1, CL, aA
¢
is reached, then we can say that when, under the
voting strategy Σ∗A (.) , an agreement
¡
1, CL, aA
¢
is reached, under the alternative voting
strategy an agreement
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
can be reached. Therefore, given that voters strictly prefer¡
1, CL, aA
¢
to
¡
1, CH , aA
¢
, then again Therefore again ViA (P,C, aA,Σ∗A (.)) ≥ ViA (P,C, aA,ΣA (.))
Since the three alternative voting strategies:
ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1,σmA (0, 0) = 1,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 1
¤
do not satisfy the definition of equilibrium voting strategy, then from the preference
ordering Vm
¡
1, CL, aj
¢
> Vm (0, 0, 0) > Vm
¡
1, CH , aj
¢
, it follows that also the alternative
voting strategies:
ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1,σmA (0, 0) = 1,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
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ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 1,σmA (0, 0) = 0,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
ΣA (.) =
£
σmA
¡
1, CH
¢
= 0,σmA (0, 0) = 1,σmA
¡
1, CL
¢
= 0
¤
cannot satisfy the definition of equilibrium voting strategy. Therefore we conclude that:
ViA (P,C, aA,ΣA (.)) ≤ ViA (P,C, aA,Σ∗A (.)) ∀ΣA (P,C, aA) 6= Σ∗A (P,C, aA) .
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Data Appendix
List of variables: definitions
• Corruption: the corruption index, taken from the Easterly and Levine Dataset, is
the Knack and Keefer measure of corruption (1980-89). The corruption index measures
corruption on a 0-6 scale assigning a score to each country, where 1 is assigned to the most
corrupt country and 6 to the least corrupt. Source: CDI-World Bank data base on political
institutions.
• Polarization: the polarization index measures the ideological distance between the
major party in government and the major party in opposition. We constructed this index
from the information on the political parties taken from the CDI-World Bank data base on
political institutions (DPI). The DPI classifies parties with the label CENTER, LEFT and
RIGHT. Our index of polarization takes value zero when the major party in government and
the major party in opposition have the same label, one when one party is CENTER and the
other is either LEFT or RIGHT and two when one party is LEFT and the other is RIGHT.
Year: 1989 - Source: CDI-World Bank data base on political institutions
• Bicameralism: this variable is a dummy taking value zero when the country as a
unicameral system and two when the country has a bicameral system. Year: 1989 - Source:
CDI-World Bank data base on political institutions and European Integration Data Set,
version 2 (24.03.2002) compiled by Ivan Barankay and Daniel Sturm.
• Fractionalization: the legislature fractionalization is defined as the chance that a
random draw will produce two legislators from diﬀerent parties. Year: 1989 - Source: CDI-
World Bank data base on political institutions
• Allhouse: this variable is a dummy that takes value one when the party of executive
controls all relevant houses. Year: 1989 - Source: CDI-World Bank data base on political
institutions.
• Govfractio: maximum degree of orientation among government parties taking values
0-2. Year: 1989 - Source: CDI-World Bank data base on political institutions
• GNIpercapita: gross national income percapita. Year: 1989 - Source: World Devel-
opment Indicators Database.
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• Population: the data come from the World Development Indicators Database. Year:
1989.
• Trade: trade as a percentage of the GDP. Year: 1989 - Source: World Development
Indicators Database.
• Freedom: Index of political right and civil liberties. Year: 1989 - This index takes
value 1-7 and is constructed by Freedom House that classifies countries as ”Free,” ”Partly
Free,” or ”Not Free” Those whose ratings average 1-2.5 are considered ”Free,” 3-5.5 ”Partly
Free,” and 5.5-7 ”Not Free.” To make presentation of results easier, we multiplied the index
by -1.
• Elf : ethnolinguistic fragmentation index. Source: T. Persson, G. Tabellini and F.
Trebbi, dataset for ”Electoral Rules and Corruption”.
• Education: average years ot total schooling of the total population during the ’80.
Years: 1980, 1985. Source: Barro-Lee Dataset.
• Religion: The data on the share of total population belonging to Roman Catholic
religion and Protestant religion are taken from T. Persson, G. Tabellini
and F. Trebbi, dataset for ”Electoral Rules and Corruption”, the dummies on Muslim
and Buddism have been constructed from the information available on the CIA World Fac-
torbook.
• Colonial origin: the colonial origin dummies are taken from T. Persson, G. Tabellini
and F. Trebbi, dataset for ”Electoral Rules and Corruption”, the three legal origin dummies
colouk, colofr, coloes refer to UK colonial origin, French colonial origin and Spanish legal
origin.
• Legal origin: the legal origin dummies are taken from T. Persson, G. Tabellini and F.
Trebbi, dataset for ”Electoral Rules and Corruption”, the three legal origin dummies legoruk,
legorfr, legorge refer to UK legal origin, french legal origin and German legal origin.
• Ever colony: this is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if a country has ever been a
colony since 1776 and zero otherwise. Source: T. Persson, G. Tabellini and F. Trebbi, dataset
for ”Electoral Rules and Corruption”. .
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Tables
Table 1 – Unicameral and Bicameral States 
Unicameral Bicameral 
Botswana Argentina 
Costa Rica Australia 
Denmark Austria 
Ecuador Belgium 
El Salvador Bolivia 
Finland Brazil 
Greece Canada 
Guatemala Colombia 
Honduras France 
Ireland Germany 
Israel Italy 
New Zealand Japan 
Nicaragua Mexico 
Norway Netherlands 
Paraguay Pakistan 
Peru South Africa 
Portugal Spain 
Senegal Switzerland 
Sri Lanka Thailand 
Sweden United States 
Turkey Uruguay 
United Kingdom   
 
Table2 -Averages by category
Mean Pol=1&2 Pol=0 bicameral unicameral colony nocolony ukcolony spaincolony 
corruption 4.525144* 3.501276* 4.357993 4.033144 3.774447 4.970833 4.284392 2.894231
GNIperc 11801.03 7772.857 12737.14 8344.091 7655 15780.67 8776.667 4257.692
pop 3.95E+07 2.11E+07 5.66E+07 1.15E+07 2.21E+07 5.48E+07 2.46E+07 2.75E+07
edu 6.858276 5.3225 6.639524 6.089773 5.849464 7.308 6.514444 4.475385
freedom 2.188276 3.092143 2.389524 2.571364 2.998929 1.518667 2.841111 3.562308
*means difference statistically significant, p-value=0.0184
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Table 3a – Partial correlations
corr polar bic fractio GNIpc trade Pop
corruption
polarization 0.356
bicameralism 0.108 -0.045
fractionalisation 0.208 -0.019 0.28
GNIperc 0.831 0.285 0.313 0.347
trade 0.298 -0.06 -0.238 0.169 0.111
population 0.029 0.144 0.473 -0.039 0.208 -0.501
catho -0.367 -0.391 0.144 0.148 -0.274 0.016 -0.128
prot 0.613 0.258 -0.132 0.218 0.56 0.109 -0.051
muslim -0.309 0.231 -0.085 -0.255 -0.318 -0.143 0.136
budd -0.073 -0.17 0.098 -0.144 -0.09 -0.052 0.179
edu 0.785 0.29 0.098 0.279 0.843 0.123 0.075
freedom -0.711 -0.322 -0.059 -0.229 -0.764 -0.213 -0.018
elf -0.337 -0.136 0.06 -0.243 -0.397 0 -0.046
colony -0.38 -0.242 -0.261 -0.256 -0.552 0.023 -0.326
colony uk 0.032 -0.006 -0.045 -0.374 -0.126 0.064 -0.097
colony fr -0.123 0.13 -0.151 -0.426 -0.206 0.008 -0.085
colony es -0.569 -0.335 -0.035 0.012 -0.585 -0.233 -0.083
legor_uk 0.192 0.069 0.015 -0.265 0.043 0.09 0.193
legor_fr -0.548 -0.223 -0.022 -0.02 -0.486 -0.118 -0.145
Notes: the detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix
Table 3b – Partial correlations 
catho prot muslim budd edu80 freed elf
catho
prot -0.491
muslim -0.332 -0.174
budd -0.328 -0.172 -0.075
edu -0.354 0.621 -0.394 -0.035
freedom 0.125 -0.358 0.372 0.01 -0.705
elf -0.126 -0.179 0.399 0.012 -0.333 0.52
colony 0.187 -0.184 0.009 -0.183 -0.248 0.458 0.35
colony uk -0.21 0.006 0.084 0.084 0.029 0.12 0.261
colony fr -0.174 -0.099 0.563 -0.042 -0.229 0.141 0.417
colony es 0.642 -0.356 -0.18 -0.18 -0.442 0.461 0.035
legor_uk -0.453 0.015 0.033 0.237 0.239 -0.02 0.308
legor_fr 0.673 -0.545 0.072 -0.294 -0.57 0.319 -0.026
Notes: the detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix
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Table 4a – Corruption ranking Table 4b- Corruption ranking (means)
Country corr89 corruption (mean) obs
Canada 6 Oecd 5.35119 21
Sweden 6 Africa 4.229167 3
Denmark 6 Middle East 3.9375 2
Netherlands 6 Latin 2.830357 14
Finland 6 Asia 2.604167 3
Norway 6
Switzerland 6
New Zealand 6
United kingdom 5.8125
South Africa 5.642857
Belgium 5.625
France 5.4375
United States 5.3125
Austria 5.25
Japan 5.1875
Ireland 5.1875
Germany 5.1875
Australia 5.1875
Costa Rica 5
Israel 5
Spain 4.5
Nicaragua 4.25
Portugal 4
Botswana 3.916667
Greece 3.875
brazil 3.875
Italy 3.8125
Argentina 3.6875
Ecuador 3.1875
Thailand 3.1875
Uruguay 3
Senegal 3
Colombia 3
sir lank 3
turkey 2.875
Mexico 2.75
Peru 2.6875
Guatemala 2
el Salvador 2
Honduras 2
Pakistan 1.625
Bolivia 1.25
Paraguay 0.9375
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Table 5 – OLS regressions, dependent variable: corruption index
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Political/Institutionals
polarization=1 0.5819 0.7158 0.7624 0.7862 0.9339 0.7890 0.8536 2.0280 2.2256
(0.89) (1.07) (1.24) (1.13) (1.03) (0.83) (0.79) (1.53) (1.47)
polarization=2 1.0098 1.1272 1.1286 1.1239 1.0609 1.1288 1.1726 1.4067 1.4626
(2.71) (2.78) (3.11) (2.16) (1.93) (1.98) (1.91) (2.34) (2.25)
bicameralism 0.3367 0.4576 4.6469 4.8005 5.4602 5.0012 5.3842 3.8428 4.6726
(0.77) (1.01) (3.27) (2.61) (2.70) (2.28) (1.99) (1.63) (1.71)
pol2bic -0.5151 -0.6847 -0.3901 -0.4182 -0.3947 -0.3794 -0.3434 -1.8870 -1.9837
(0.61) (0.79) (0.49) (0.47) (0.40) (0.38) (0.31) (1.37) (1.31)
pol3bic -1.1722 -1.4841 -1.6001 -1.5962 -1.4410 -1.4529 -1.6036 -1.6482 -1.7801
(2.22) (2.62) (3.16) (2.44) (2.11) (2.09) (2.08) (2.27) (2.21)
fractionalisation 0.9968 0.7259 2.2524 2.2434 2.6648 2.1442 2.8045
(0.88) (0.51) (1.21) (1.19) (1.19) (1.04) (1.15)
fracbic -6.2670 -6.1626 -6.9067 -6.1803 -6.9662 -4.4181 -5.8956
(3.03) (2.26) (2.27) (1.86) (1.66) (1.24) (1.39)
allhouse 0.5965 0.6365 0.5295 0.5785 0.5629
(1.25) (1.30) (0.94) (1.13) (0.98)
govfractio -0.1625 -0.1534 -0.1597 -0.2024 -0.2392
(0.55) (0.51) (0.45) (0.64) (0.63)
Socio-Economic
GNIpc 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(8.77) (4.69) (4.63) (2.02) (2.00) (1.87) (1.67) (2.25) (2.13)
lpop 0.0728 0.1202 0.0850 0.0868 -0.0057 0.0254 0.0231 0.0974 0.1073
(0.51) (0.72) (0.57) (0.51) (0.03) (0.13) (0.11) (0.48) (0.47)
trade 0.0111 0.0116 0.0189 0.0177 0.0167 0.0145 0.0147 0.0124 0.0133
(1.94) (1.79) (3.00) (2.17) (2.05) (1.61) (1.50) (1.50) (1.47)
freedom -0.1531 -0.2350 -0.2064 -0.2091 -0.1056 -0.1303
(0.98) (1.43) (1.19) (1.07) (0.59) (0.67)
elf 0.1379 0.2181 -0.0482 -0.0257 -0.5036 -0.3419
(0.18) (0.23) (0.05) (0.02) (0.43) (0.25)
catho80 0.0029 0.0028 0.0055 0.0058 0.0089 0.0073
(0.33) (0.29) (0.51) (0.49) (0.87) (0.66)
prot80 0.0079 0.0058 0.0081 0.0148 0.0072 0.0108
(0.90) (0.66) (0.83) (0.95) (0.79) (0.74)
budd 0.5461 0.5680 0.7554 0.8123 0.6113 0.3927
(0.69) (0.72) (0.87) (0.74) (0.73) (0.37)
Muslim -0.1312 0.0417 -0.0150 0.1263 -0.9203 -1.2446
(0.16) (0.05) (0.02) (0.12) (0.84) (0.86)
regional dummie NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Colonial
ever colony NO NO NO NO NO YES YES NO NO
colonial origin NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
legal origin NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Const 0.098 -0.365 -0.936 -0.2322 0.3757 -0.2756 -1.2633 -1.9191 -3.1840
(0.04) (0.12) (0.34) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.33) (0.53) (0.77)
Obs 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
R-squared 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92
Notes: The detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix. Absolute values of t-statistics 
in parentheses. The religious controls include four religions: Buddist, Catholic,Muslim and Protestant. The regional 
dummies refer to the following regions: OECD, Latin America, Middle East,  Africa and Asia. 
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Table 6 – OLS regressions, dependent variable: corruption index 
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Political/Institutionals      
polarization=1 0.5819 0.7158 0.7624 0.7862 0.9339 
 (0.89) (1.07) (1.24) (1.13) (1.03) 
      
polarization=2 1.0098 1.1272 1.1286 1.1239 1.0609 
 (2.71) (2.78) (3.11) (2.16) (1.93) 
      
bicameralism 0.3367 0.4576 4.6469 4.8005 5.4602 
 (0.77) (1.01) (3.27) (2.61) (2.70) 
      
pol2bic -0.5151 -0.6847 -0.3901 -0.4182 -0.3947 
 (0.61) (0.79) (0.49) (0.47) (0.40) 
      
pol3bic -1.1722 -1.4841 -1.6001 -1.5962 -1.4410 
 (2.22) (2.62) (3.16) (2.44) (2.11) 
      
fractionalisation   0.9968 0.7259 2.2524 
   (0.88) (0.51) (1.21) 
      
fracbic   -6.2670 -6.1626 -6.9067 
   (3.03) (2.26) (2.27) 
      
allhouse     0.5965 
     (1.25) 
      
govfractio     -0.1625 
     (0.55) 
Socio-Economic      
GNIpc 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (8.77) (4.69) (4.63) (2.02) (2.00) 
      
lpop 0.0728 0.1202 0.0850 0.0868 -0.0057 
 (0.51) (0.72) (0.57) (0.51) (0.03) 
      
trade 0.0111 0.0116 0.0189 0.0177 0.0167 
 (1.94) (1.79) (3.00) (2.17) (2.05) 
      
latin  -0.3802 -0.3320 -0.5034 -0.6546 
  (0.81) (0.71) (0.67) (0.88) 
      
asia  -0.5477 0.2583 0.0315 0.1865 
  (0.80) (0.38) (0.03) (0.20) 
      
africa  0.6343 0.5004 0.2439 0.2282 
  (1.19) (1.01) (0.41) (0.38) 
      
mid  -0.7597 -0.7019 -0.2891 -0.3317 
  (1.20) (1.19) (0.37) (0.40) 
Notes: The detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix. 
Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.  
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Table 6 (continues)- OLS regressions, dependent variable: corruption index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
freedom    -0.1531 -0.2350 
    (0.98) (1.43) 
elf    0.1379 0.2181 
    (0.18) (0.23) 
      
catho80    0.0029 0.0028 
    (0.33) (0.29) 
prot80    0.0079 0.0058 
    (0.90) (0.66) 
budd    0.5461 0.5680 
    (0.69) (0.72) 
Muslim    -0.1312 0.0417 
    (0.16) (0.05) 
Const 0.0987 -0.3651 -0.9365 -0.2322 0.3757 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.34) (0.08) (0.12) 
Obs 43 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.79 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.89 
Notes: The detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix. Absolute values of 
t-statistics in parentheses.  
63
Table 7 – OLS regressions, dependent variable: corruption index 
Controls (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Political/Institutionals     
polarization=1 0.7890 0.8536 2.0280 2.2256 
 (0.83) (0.79) (1.53) (1.47) 
     
polarization=2 1.1288 1.1726 1.4067 1.4626 
 (1.98) (1.91) (2.34) (2.25) 
     
bicameralism 5.0012 5.3842 3.8428 4.6726 
 (2.28) (1.99) (1.63) (1.71) 
     
pol2bic -0.3794 -0.3434 -1.8870 -1.9837 
 (0.38) (0.31) (1.37) (1.31) 
     
pol3bic -1.4529 -1.6036 -1.6482 -1.7801 
 (2.09) (2.08) (2.27) (2.21) 
     
fractionalisation 2.2434 2.6648 2.1442 2.8045 
 (1.19) (1.19) (1.04) (1.15) 
     
fracbic -6.1803 -6.9662 -4.4181 -5.8956 
 (1.86) (1.66) (1.24) (1.39) 
     
allhouse 0.6365 0.5295 0.5785 0.5629 
 (1.30) (0.94) (1.13) (0.98) 
     
govfractio -0.1534 -0.1597 -0.2024 -0.2392 
 (0.51) (0.45) (0.64) (0.63) 
Socio-Economic     
GNIpc 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (1.87) (1.67) (2.25) (2.13) 
     
lpop 0.0254 0.0231 0.0974 0.1073 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.48) (0.47) 
     
trade 0.0145 0.0147 0.0124 0.0133 
 (1.61) (1.50) (1.50) (1.47) 
     
latin -0.9884 -0.9840 -3.2062 -3.5415 
 (1.05) (0.97) (2.00) (1.98) 
     
asia 0.0446 0.1953 0.2939 1.0236 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.28) (0.72) 
     
africa 0.1337 0.2589 -0.0141 0.0117 
 (0.21) (0.37) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
mid -0.2511 -0.3141 0.4056 0.5882 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.44) (0.53) 
Notes: The detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix. Absolute values of t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7 – (continues) - OLS regressions, dependent variable: corruption index 
 (6) (7) (8) (9) 
     
freedom -0.2064 -0.2091 -0.1056 -0.1303 
 (1.19) (1.07) (0.59) (0.67) 
     
elf -0.0482 -0.0257 -0.5036 -0.3419 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.43) (0.25) 
     
catho80 0.0055 0.0058 0.0089 0.0073 
 (0.51) (0.49) (0.87) (0.66) 
     
prot80 0.0081 0.0148 0.0072 0.0108 
 (0.83) (0.95) (0.79) (0.74) 
     
budd 0.7554 0.8123 0.6113 0.3927 
 (0.87) (0.74) (0.73) (0.37) 
     
Muslim -0.0150 0.1263 -0.9203 -1.2446 
 (0.02) (0.12) (0.84) (0.86) 
Colonial     
ever colony 0.2791 0.2958   
 (0.60) (0.58)   
     
colouk   0.7364 1.0022 
   (1.29) (1.17) 
     
colofr   1.7717 2.1239 
   (1.05) (1.09) 
     
coloesp   2.5729 2.9394 
   (1.80) (1.80) 
     
legoruk  0.7208  0.2807 
  (0.59)  (0.21) 
     
legorfr  0.8071  0.8313 
  (0.57)  (0.60) 
     
legorge  0.9766  0.9415 
  (0.78)  (0.77) 
     
Const -0.2756 -1.2633 -1.9191 -3.1840 
 (0.08) (0.33) (0.53) (0.77) 
     
Obs 43 43 43 43 
R-squared 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92 
Notes: The detailed description of the variables and their sources are in the appendix. Absolute values 
of t-statistics in parentheses. 
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